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Abstract
In this paper we evaluate the quantitative impact that a number of alternative reform sce-
narios may have on the total expenditure for public pensions in Spain. Our quantitative ﬁndings
can be summarized in two sentences. For all the reforms considered, the ﬁnancial impact of the
mechanical eﬀect (change in beneﬁts) is order of magnitudes larger than the behavioral impact
or change in behavior. For the two Spanish reforms, we ﬁnd once again that their eﬀect on the
outstanding liability of the Spanish Social Security System is essentially negligible: neither the
mechanical nor the behavioral eﬀects amount to much for the 1997 reform, and amount to very
little for the 2002 amendment.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we evaluate the quantitative impact that a number of alternative reform scenarios may
have on the total expenditure for public pensions in Spain. We consider ﬁve scenarios, the ﬁrst three
are common also to the other countries considered in this volume, while the second two correspond
to speciﬁc sets of reform measures that the Spanish government has adopted, respectively, in 1997
and 2002.
Each reform scenario consists in changes to one or more of the constitutive elements of a public
pension system: retirement age, replacement rate as a function of the number of contributive years,
penalization for early retirement, contribution rate. The kind of reforms considered here, similarly
to those debated in very many advanced countries, would have been politically unthinkable twenty
or thirty years ago, when most of the current work force began its contributive careers. Hence,
the changes considered, should they be implemented, would certainly take most contributors “oﬀ
guard” and engender, for given contributive histories and wage proﬁles, substantial changes in
their net position toward the social security administration. While, when a reform takes place,
workers are likely to react to the change of rules by modifying their behavior, it is also clear that
a completely satisfactory reaction is feasible only for workers that are at the very beginning of
their contributive histories. In others words, reforming pension system will mechanically aﬀect
expenditure by changing the relationship between past work histories, contributions and expected
beneﬁts in such a way that it cannot be undue by the reaction of the economic agents. We call
this the “mechanical” eﬀect, to distinguish it from the “behavioral” one. The latter is meant to
measure the variation in expenditure brought about by the changing behavior of the workers facing
a diﬀerent incentive system. Our evaluation aims at providing a separate quantitative evaluation
of the these two eﬀects.
To accomplish this, we place some eﬀort at modelling the behavioral response of diﬀerent
individuals to the changing incentives provided by each reform scenario. We use the results from
previous microeconometric studies of Spanish retirement patterns (especially Boldrin et al. [2001b])
to capture the behavioral responses of diﬀerent individuals. Such behavioral responses have been
estimated by means of a family of reduced form models of retirement behavior in which various
ﬁnancial measures of the incentive to retirement are used.
In keeping with the tradition of this series, we consider both some “common” scenarios, which
apply equally to each country in the group, and some national scenarios, which are meant to capture
hypotheses of reform historically relevant for the speciﬁc country under examination. In the case
of Spain, we simulate the impact of the 1997 reform (which will be completely implemented by the
end of 2002) and of the 2002 amendment to the same reform (from now on, respectively, the reform
and the amendment). For a summary description of these measures see Table 1.
Our quantitative ﬁndings can be summarized in two sentences. For all the reforms considered,
the ﬁnancial impact of the mechanical eﬀect is order of magnitudes larger than the behavioral
impact. For the two Spanish reforms, we ﬁnd once again that their eﬀect on the outstanding
liability of the Spanish Social Security System is essentially negligible: neither the mechanical nor
the behavioral eﬀects amount to much for the 1997 reform, and amount to very little for the 2002
amendment.
The reason for the ﬁrs ﬁnding is, quite simply, that the underlying behavioral model which is
meant to map changes in ﬁnancial incentives into changes in retirement patterns explain a very
small proportion of the measured variability in actual retirement behavior: and, of that small
portion, the part which is captured by the ﬁnancial incentives is just a fraction. Hence, changing
ﬁnancial incentives does not seem to make much of a diﬀerence, at least according to our sample,2 BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM 2
the behavioral model adopted in these studies, and the estimation we have performed. The reason
for the second ﬁnding is that, given the structure of the current Spanish labor force and given the
contributive histories of its members, the reform and the amendment make little diﬀerence: for most
individuals, the social security wealth calculations give very similar numbers with the old and the
new rules. Further, as the new rules change incentives to retirement only very slightly, we predict
that people’s behavior will also change only very slightly. If the reforms had been introduced
to reduce public pension expenditure, then our conclusion is that they are very ineﬀective and
badly designed. If they had been introduced to pretend something was being done without doing
anything, then they can be declared a success.
2 Background of the system
2.1 Public programs for old–age workers
As customary, we provide a brief description of the system pre-1997 reform. Changes introduced
by the reform and the amendment are noted later. For more details on the Spanish social security
system, we refer the reader to Boldrin et al. [1999, 2001a].
Table 1 summarizes the programs available after age 50. Leaving aside private pensions, there
are three public programs that aﬀect the behavior of old age workers: unemployment beneﬁts,
disability beneﬁts and retirement pensions.
Unemployment beneﬁts are generally conditional on previous spells of contributions and are
available only for workers in the General Regime (RGSS) of the Spanish Social Security (S3)
system.1 There are two continuation programs for those who have exhausted their entitlement to
contributory unemployment beneﬁts: one for those aged 45+ (UB45+ program) and the other for
those aged 52+ (UB52+ program). The latter is a special subsidy for unemployed people that are
older than 52, lack other income sources, have contributed to unemployment insurance for at least
6 years in their life and, except for age, satisfy all requirements for an old-age pension.
The S3 system provides insurance against both temporary and permanent illness or disability.
Contributory disability (DI) beneﬁts are far more generous than any other old-age program, since
they are not subject to penalties for young age or insuﬃcient years of contribution.2 DI beneﬁts are
subject to approval by a medical examiner (notoriously, the tightness of the admissibility criteria
used by examiners varies both over time and across regions) and, since the early 1990s, they have
become harder to obtain at older ages. In fact, and contrary to the practice prevailing during
the 1980s, it is now uncommon to access permanent DI beneﬁts after age 55. This has been
achieved mainly by tightening the disability evaluation process for the temporary illness program
(Incapacidad Laboral Transitoria) which, in the past, was most often used as a bridge to retirement.
Both the unemployment and the disability plans oﬀer, as we will argue momentarily, a “pathway
to early retirement” alternative to the “oﬃcial” one (the latter consisting of early retirement at 60
and normal retirement at 65). Such alternative pathways are taken in due account in our estimation
and simulation procedures.
The retirement program we label oﬃcial (or regular) oﬀers two options: early retirement and
normal retirement. Early retirement is possible from age 60 but it only applies to workers who
1People enrolled in any of the Special Regimes (RESS) either have no access to unemployment beneﬁts (self-
employed and household employees) or have special unemployment programs (farmers and ﬁshermen).
2For a discussion of non-contributory disability pensions and other marginal insurance schemes (which are not
relevant to the following analysis and have little or no impact on the retirement decisions of the workers we are
considering) see Boldrin et al. [1999].2 BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM 3
Table 1: Public programs at older ages. (1)
Unemployment Disability Private Social security
insurance Insurance pension plan beneﬁts
50 cont. from 45+ cont. /non-cont. yes (2)
52 cont. from 52+ cont. /non-cont. yes (2)
55 cont. from 52+ cont. /non-cont. yes (2)
60 cont. cont. /non-cont. yes ER: cont.
65 – – yes NR: cont./non-cont.
Keys: cont.: contributory; non-cont.: non contributory;
45+ and 52+: Special UI program for 45+ and 52+ workers enrolled in the RGSS.
ER: early retirement, NR: normal retirement.
Notes: (1) All public programs provide beneﬁts for dependants.
(2). There are age bonuses for certain professions, allowing for retirement before 60.
started their contributive career before 1967. The normal retirement age is 65, although some
professional groups have lower normal retirement ages (miners, military personnel, policemen and
ﬁshermen are the main ones). Collective wage settlements often impose mandatory retirement at
age 65, facilitate retirement at 64 with full beneﬁts, or encourage retirement between 60 and 63
through lump sum payments.
2.2 Social Security regimes and their rules
Under current legislation, public contributory pensions are provided by the following programs.
² The “General Social Security Scheme” (R´ egimen General de la Seguridad Social, or RGSS)
and the “Special Social Security Schemes” (Reg´ ımenes Especiales de la Seguridad Social, or
RESS) cover, respectively, the private sector employees and the self-employed workers and
professionals. The RGSS covers also the members of cooperative ﬁrms, the employees of most
public administrations other than the central governments and all unemployed individuals
complying with the minimum number of contributory years when reaching 65. The RESS
include ﬁve special schemes:
1. Self-employed, R´ egimen Especial de Trabajadores Aut´ onomos or RETA.
2. Agricultural workers and small farmers, R´ egimen Especial Agrario or REA.
3. Domestic workers, R´ egimen Especial de Empleados de Hogar or REEH.
4. Sailors, R´ egimen Especial de Trabajadores del Mar or RETM.
5. Coal miners, R´ egimen Especial de la Miner´ ıa del Carb´ on or REMC.
² The scheme for government employees (R´ egimen de Clases Pasivas, or RCP) includes public
servants employed by the central government and its local branches. In this study we do not
consider this regime. Summary information about its structure and rules are reported later
in this Section.2 BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM 4
Legislation approved by Parliament in 1997 established the progressive elimination of all the
special regimes but RETA by the end of year 2001. At the moment, however, this piece of legislation
has not been implemented, and the special regimes are still active.
2.3 Rules of the RGSS
This subsection describes the rules governing, since 1985, the old-age and survivors pensions in the
RGSS. The changes introduced by the 1997 reform (R97) and the 2002 (A02) amendment will be
illustrated as we go along. A summary of the basic technical aspects of the pre- and post-1997
systems can be found in Table 2.
Financing and Eligibility
The RGSS is a pure pay-as-you-go scheme. Contributions are a ﬁxed proportion of covered earnings,
deﬁned as total earnings, excluding payments for overtime work, between a ﬂoor and a ceiling that
vary by broadly deﬁned professional categories. Currently, eleven categories are distinguished, each
one with its own ceiling and ﬂoor for covered earnings.
The current RGSS contribution rate is 28.3 percent, of which 23.6 percent is attributed to the
employer and the remaining 4.7 percent to the employee. A tax rate of 14 percent is levied on
earnings from overtime work.
Entitlement to an old-age pension requires at least 15 years of contributions. As a general rule,
recipiency is conditional on having reached age 65 and is incompatible with income from any kind
of employment requiring aﬃliation to the Social Security system.
Beneﬁt computation
When eligibility conditions are met, a retiring worker receives an initial monthly pension Pt equal
to
Pt = ®n BRt;
where the beneﬁt base (base reguladora) BRt is a weighted average of covered monthly earnings
















where Wt¡j and It¡j are earnings and the consumer price index in the j-th month before retirement.
Pensions are paid in fourteen annual installments, hence the division by 112 in the previous formula.
The replacement rate ®n depends on the age of the retirees and on the number of years of






0; if n < 15,
:6 + :02(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 35,
1; if 35 · n.
In the case of early retirement, i.e. for ages between 60 and 65, ®n is determined by the previous
formula multiplied a penalization factor. The latter is equal to :60 at 60, and increases of :08 each
year, until reaching the value of 1:0 at age 65.2 BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM 5
Beginning in 1997, the number of reference years used for computing BRt has been increased
by one every year until 2003, to reach a total of 15 years. The formula for computing ®n has been





0; if n < 15,
:5 + :03(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 25,
:8 + :02(n ¡ 25); if 25 · n < 35,
1; if 35 · n.
The penalization factors have, basically, remained the same, exception made for workers with 40
or more years of contributions (details in the next subsection).
The A02 amendment allows for the possibility of ®n being greater that one when people are
above 65 years of age, that is
®n = f1 + :02(a ¡ 65); if 65 · a and n ¸ 35,
In all of our simulations we use the pre-1997 formula, which was in place over the relevant sample
period. We consider the impact of the 1997 reform and the 2002 amendment when examining
alternative policies (see respectively R97 and A02 in Section 7).
Outstanding pensions are fully indexed to price inﬂation, as measured by the consumer price
index. Until 1986, pensions were also indexed to real wage growth.
Early retirement
The normal retirement age is 65 but early retirement at age 60 is permitted as a general rule for
those who became aﬃliated to the Social Security system ( Mutualidades Laborales) before 1967.
The replacement rate for early retirees is reduced by 8 percentage points for each year under age
65. Starting from 1997, workers who retires after the age of 60 with 40 or more contributive years
are charged a penalty of only 7 percent for each year under age 65. The 2002 amendment has





0; if a < 61,
1 ¡ ·(a ¡ 60); if 61 · a < 65,




> > > > <
> > > > :
0:08 if n = 30,
0:075 if 31 · n · 34,
0:07 if 35 · n ·< 37,
0:065 if 38 · n ·< 39,
0:06 if 40 · n.
Unless a collective labor agreement prescribes mandatory retirement, individuals may continue
working after age 65. Before 2002 there were no incentives to work past age 65. As mentioned, the
2002 legislation now allows for
®n = f1 + :02(a ¡ 65); if 65 · a and n ¸ 35,
and eliminates social security contributions for workers meeting the eligibility criteria for full normal
retirement (a ¸ 65 and n ¸ 35) and who continue working.
About ten percent of the workers enrolled in the RGSS is actually exempt from reduction in
the replacement rate in case of early retirement. This applies to a number of privileged categories2 BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM 6
(bullﬁghters, employees of railroads, airlines, and public transportation, for example), or to workers
who were laid oﬀ during cases of industrial restructuring regulated by special legislation. These
exemption rights are “portable” in proportion to the number of years spent working in the privileged
sector.
Maximum and minimum pension
Pensions are subject to a ceiling, legislated annually and roughly equal to the ceiling on covered
earnings. The 2000 ceiling corresponds to about 4.3 times the minimum wage (salario m´ ınimo
interprofesional, or SMI) and about 1.6 times the average monthly earnings in the manufacturing
and service sectors. If the initial old-age pension, computed as above, is below a minimum, then
the minimum pension is paid. The latter is also legislated annually. Other things being equal,
minimum pensions are higher for those who are older than 65 or have a dependent spouse.
In the last decade, minimum pensions grew at about the same rate as nominal wages, whereas
maximum pensions grew at the rate of inﬂation. The ratio between the minimum old-age pension
and the minimum wage has been increasing steadily from the late 1970s (it was 75 percent in 1975)
until reaching almost 100 percent in the early 1990s. The percentage of RGSS retirees receiving a
minimum pension has been declining steadily, from over 75 percent in the late 1970s to 27 percent
in 1995.
Family considerations
A pensioner receives a ﬁxed annual allowance for each dependent child that is younger than 18
or disabled. In 2000, this allowance was equal to 48,420 pesetas for each child under 18, and to
468,720 pesetas (45 percent of the annualized minimum wage) for each disabled child.
Survivors (spouse, children, other relatives) may receive a fraction of the beneﬁt base of the
deceased if the latter was a pensioner or died before retirement after contributing for at least 500
days in the last 5 years. The beneﬁt base is computed diﬀerently in the two cases. If the deceased
was a pensioner, the beneﬁt base coincides with the pension. If the deceased was working, it is
computed as an average of covered earnings over an uninterrupted period of 2 years chosen by the
beneﬁciary among the last 7 years immediately before death. If death occurred because of a work
accident or a professional illness, then the beneﬁt base coincides with the last earnings.
The surviving spouse gets 45 percent of the beneﬁt base of the deceased (46 percent after
the 2002 amendment, fraction that will be increased further in the forthcoming years). In case
of divorce, the pension is divided between the various spouses according to the length of their
marriage with the deceased. Such a pension is compatible with labor income and any other old-age
or disability pension, but is lost if the spouse remarries.
Each of the surviving children gets 20 percent of the beneﬁt base until the age of 18 (amount
raised to 23 per cent in 1997). An orphan who is the sole beneﬁciary may receive up to 65 percent
of the beneﬁt base. If there are several surviving children, the sum of the pensions to the surviving
spouse (if any) and the children cannot exceed 100 percent of the beneﬁt base.
A Spanish peculiarity is the “pension in favor of family members”. This pension entitles other
surviving relatives (e.g. parents, grandparents, siblings, nephews, etc.) to 20 percent of the beneﬁt
base of the principal if they satisfy certain eligibility conditions (older than 45, do not have a
spouse, do not have other means of subsistence, have been living with and depending economically
upon the deceased for the last two years). To this pension, one may add the 45 percent survivors
pension if there is no surviving spouse or eligible surviving children.2 BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM 7
2.4 Special schemes
In this section we sketch the main diﬀerences between the general and the special schemes. Whereas
rules and regulations for sailors and coal miners are very similar to the ones for the general scheme,
special rules apply to self-employed, farmers, agricultural workers, domestic helpers and a few other
categories not discussed here, such as part-time workers, artists, travelling salespeople, and bull-
ﬁghters. Beside diﬀerences in the SS tax rate and the deﬁnition of covered earnings, an important
diﬀerence is the fact that the aﬃliated to the special schemes have no early retirement option
(exception made for miners and sailors).
The rest of this section focuses on the special schemes for self-employed workers (RETA) and
farmers (REA), which together represent 93 percent of the aﬃliated to the special schemes and 86
percent of the pensions they pay out.
2.4.1 Self-employed
While the SS tax rate is the same for the RETA and the general scheme (28.3 percent in 2000),
covered earnings are computed diﬀerently, as the self-employed are essentially free to choose their
covered earnings between a ﬂoor and a ceiling legislated annually. Not surprisingly in the light
of the strong progressivity of Spanish personal income taxes, a suspiciously large proportion of
self-employed workers report earnings equal to the legislated ﬂoor until they reach about age 50
to 55. After that age one observes a sudden increase in reported covered earnings. This behaviors
exploits the “ﬁnite memory” in the formula for the calculation of the initial pension.
In 2000, the RETA contributive ﬂoor and ceiling were equal to 116,160 pta and 407,790 pta per
month respectively, corresponding to 1.4 and 5 times the minimum wage, and to .5 and 1.9 times
the average earnings in manufacturing and services. To reduce misreporting of earnings on the part
of the self-employed, a diﬀerent ceiling applies to self-employed aged 50+ who had not reported
higher earnings in previous years. In 2000 the later was only 219,000 pta per month, roughly equal
to average monthly earnings.
A crucial diﬀerence with respect to the general scheme is that, under the RETA, recipiency of
an old-age pension is compatible with maintaining the self-employed status. The implications of
this provision for the retirement behavior of self-employed workers are discussed later on.
Other important provisions are the following: RETA only requires 5 years of contributions in
the 10 years immediately before the death of the principal in order to qualify for survivors pensions.
Under RETA, the latter is 50 percent of the beneﬁt base. If the principal was not a pensioner at the
time of death, the beneﬁt base is computed as the average of covered earnings over an uninterrupted
period of 5 years chosen by the beneﬁciary among the last 10 years before the death of the principal.
2.4.2 Farmers
In this case, both the SS tax rate and the covered earnings diﬀer with respect to the general scheme.
Self-employed farmers pay 19.75 percent of a tax base that is legislated annually and is unrelated
to actual earnings. In 2000, this was equal to 91,740 pta per month, corresponding to 1.24 times
the minimum wage and about 40 percent the average monthly earnings in the manufacturing and
service sectors.
Farm employees, instead, pay 11.5 percent of a monthly base that depends on their professional
category and is also legislated yearly. In addition, for each day of work, their employer must pay
15.5 percent of a daily base that also varies by professional category and is legislated annually.2 BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM 8
2.5 Government employees
We now describe brieﬂy the main diﬀerences between the general scheme and the RCP, the pension
fund for the employees of the central government.
Public servants are divided into 5 categories, labelled from A to E, corresponding loosely to
decreasing school levels: A for college graduates (doctor, licenciado, arquitecto o equivalente), B
for people holding certain kinds of college diplomas (ingeniero t´ ecnico, diplomado, etc.), C for high
school graduates (bachiller o equivalente), D for junior high school diplomas (graduado escolar o
equivalente), and E for individuals with lower education levels (certiﬁcado de escolaridad). For
each of these categories, the budget law deﬁnes every year a theoretical SS wage (haber regulador)
which is used to compute SS contributions and pensions. The implied wage scale has remained
relatively constant since 1985. The top to bottom ratio never exceeded 2.5.
SS contributions are the sum of three parts, each proportional to the legislated covered wage,
according to proportionality factors legislated annually: a) derechos pasivos (3.86 percent in 1995),
b) cuota mensual de Mutualidades (1.89 percent), and c) aportaci´ on del Estado (paid by the gov-
ernment, it varies between 6 and 10 percent depending on the sector of the administration). To
parallel this three-part contribution structure, actual pensions are computed by adding up three
sources of beneﬁts: a) the basic pension (derechos pasivos), b) a portion directed to the pensioner’s
family (ayuda familiar), and c) a complementary portion coming from the various Mutualidades
(ISFAS, MUFACE, MUGEJU).
The basic monthly pension of a public servant who retires in month t after contributing for n
years to RCP is computed as Pt = ®n BRt, where the dependence of ®n upon the numbers of years
worked has changed frequently over time. For n ¸ 15, the last table of proportionality factors,
legislated in 1990, can be reasonably (but not exactly) approximated by
®n = min(1; 1 ¡ :0366(35 ¡ n)):
The diﬀerences with respect to the general scheme are various. First, while the entitlement to
a pension still requires at least 15 years of contributions, the replacement rate (the ratio of the
pension to the beneﬁt base) increases somewhat irregularly with seniority, up to 100 percent after
35 years. So, for example, 15 years of service give right to a pension equal to only 26.92 percent
of the beneﬁt base, against 60 percent of the general scheme. After 30 years the same ratio has
increased to 81.73 percent, against 90 percent for the general scheme.
Second, the beneﬁt base is computed as a weighted average of covered earnings upon which the






where pi is the fraction of the career spent on leveli and Hit are the covered earnings corresponding
to level i, as determined by the current law at time t.
Third, unlike the general scheme, the RCP imposes mandatory retirement at age 65. Exception
are made for a few special categories, such as university professors and judges. On the other hand,
the RCP allows for early retirement at the age of 60, without any penalty for public servants with
at least 30 years of service (20 for military personnel).
A fourth important diﬀerence with respect to the general scheme is compatibility between RCP
pensions recipiency and income from continuing to work. In a number of special cases, RCP
pensioners are allowed to keep a public sector occupation, as long as this does not provide them
with a “regular ﬂow of income” (for example, this is the case of members of legislative bodies). More3 KEY INGREDIENTS OF THE RETIREMENT MODELS 9
importantly, the legislation allows RCP pensions to be cumulated with earnings from employment
in the private sector.
When a public servant is dismissed because of disability (and therefore starts drawing a disability
pension) or dies (and the survivors are therefore entitled to a pension), the missing years between
the person’s age at the time of the event and 65 are counted as actual years of service in the
computation of either the disability or the survivors pension. Should the disability be caused by
an accident while on duty, the disability pension is doubled.
3 Key ingredients of the retirement models
In this section we review the main steps taken in order to estimate reduced form retirement models.
First we describe the sample and the characteristics of the earning processes. Then we construct
the various measures of Social Security incentives. In the last part we review the results from the
estimated models.
3.1 The Sample
Our main microeconomic data set is based on administrative records from the Spanish Social
Security Administration (Historiales Laborales de la Seguridad Social, or HLSS from now on). The
sample consists of 250,000 individual work histories randomly drawn from the historical ﬁles of
SS aﬃliates (Fichero Hist´ orico de Aﬁliados or FHA). The sample includes only individuals aged
40+ on July 31, 1998, the date at which the ﬁles were prepared. The sample contains individuals
from the RGSS and the ﬁve special regimes, RETA, REA, REEH, RTMC and RTMAR. As we
mentioned above, civil servants and other Central Government employees are not covered by the
SS Administration and are not considered in this study.
The data set consists of three ﬁles. The ﬁrst ﬁle (“History ﬁle”, or H ﬁle) contains the work
history of the individuals in the sample. Each record in this ﬁle describes a single employment
spell of the individual. As we argue below, the work histories are very accurate for spells or
histories which began after the mid–1960s. The second ﬁle (“Covered Earnings ﬁle”, or CE ﬁle)
contains (annual averages) of covered earnings (bases de cotizaci´ on) from 1986 to 1995. The third
ﬁle (“Beneﬁts ﬁle”, or B ﬁle) contains information on the lifetime SS beneﬁts received by the
individuals in the sample. Beneﬁts are classiﬁed by function (retirement, disability, survival, etc.)
and initial amount received. To be more precise, the beneﬁts ﬁle contains the initial beneﬁt amount
and the length of the period during which the beneﬁt was received. A fourth ﬁle (“Relatives ﬁle”,
or R ﬁle) is also available; it reports some beneﬁts paid to relatives of the individual while members
of his/her household.
For each individual in the sample, who contributed to SS during the 1986–1995 period, the
CE ﬁle reports the annual average of covered earnings together with the contributions paid. For
individuals enrolled in either the RGSS or the RTMC, covered earnings are a doubly censored
(from above and below) version of real earnings. This is due to the existence of legislated ceilings
and ﬂoors, as reported earlier. For people enrolled in SS regimes other than RGSS and RTMC,
covered earnings are chosen by the individual within given ceilings and ﬂoors (see Section 2 above
for details) and, consequently, there is no clear link between covered and actual earnings in this
case.
For each employment spell in the HLSS-H ﬁle, we know age, sex and marital status of the
person, the duration of the spell (in days), the type of contract (in particular, we can distinguish
between part-time and full-time contracts), the social security regime, the contributive group, the3 KEY INGREDIENTS OF THE RETIREMENT MODELS 10
Table 2: Pension provisions, institutions and systems
RGSS System RGSS System
Institutions 1985–1996 after 1997
Provisions aﬀecting all individuals
A. Basic ingredients

























–Contribution period 8 years 15
–Fraction actualized 6 years 13
A2. Fiscal system
–income tax [progressive] id.
–labor tax linear (regime and group speciﬁc) id.
B. Replacement rates
- Function of contributive years
(
0; if n < 15,
:6 + :02(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 35,




0; if n < 15,
:5 + :03(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 25,
:8 + :02(n ¡ 25); if 25 · n < 35,
1; if 35 · n.
- Function of age exception for n ¸ 40: (
0; if a < 60,
:6 + :8(a ¡ 60); if 60 · a < 65,
1; if 65 · a.
(
0; if a < 60,
:65 + :07(a ¡ 60); if 60 · a < 65,
1; if 65 · a.
Provisions aﬀecting particular individuals
C. Income tax exemptions
–maximum pension exempted / Minimum wages id.
–maximum income exempted / Minimum wages id.
D. Min/Max contributions
–Min. level of contribution (speciﬁc for 12 group) id.
–Max. level of contribution (speciﬁc for 12 group) id.
E. Min. and Max. pensions
–Minimum pension / Minimum wages and family speciﬁc id.
–Maximum pension 4.3 minimum wage (in 1995) id.
F. Age bonuses YES (occupation speciﬁc) id
G. Survivor beneﬁts 0:45 £ (beneﬁt base) id
H. Dependant beneﬁts 18, 22 (means tested) 18, 23 (means tested)
Eligibility 2 years contrib. last 10 years 2 out of last 15 years
Pension computation bt = maxfminf˜ bt[n;e;BR(BC;I)]; btg; btg
where ˜ bt is the pension in A+B and
bt and bt are respectively the maximum and minimum pension.
2002 Amendment
-Scheme for early retirement ®n=
(
0; if a < 61,
1 ¡ ·(a ¡ 60) if 61 · a < 65;





0:08 if n = 30
0:075 if 31 · n · 34
0:07 if 35 · n ·< 37
0:065 if 38 · n ·< 39
0:06 if 40 · n.
-Premium for late retirement ®n= 1 + 0.02 (a-65)iﬀ n ¸ 30
-Social Security contributions: No contributions for workers 65+, provided n ¸ 35
-Survivor beneﬁts 0:46 £ (beneﬁt base)3 KEY INGREDIENTS OF THE RETIREMENT MODELS 11
cause for the termination of the spell, the sector of employment (4-digits SIC), and the region of
residence (52 Spanish provinces). For each individual in the H ﬁle who has received some beneﬁts at
any point in time, we know most of the information that the SS Administration uses to compute the
monthly beneﬁts to be paid. In particular, we know the initial and current pension, the beneﬁt base
(base reguladora), the number of contributive years, the current integration toward the minimum
pension (complementos por el m´ ınimo), the date pension was claimed, the date it was awarded, the
type of beneﬁts, etc. See Boldrin et al. [2001b] for a description of the demographic characteristics
of the sample and the sample selection rules.
3.2 Earnings distribution, earnings histories and projections
As commented in section 3.1, we do not observe earnings directly but only covered earnings. Cov-
ered earnings are a doubly censored version of earnings for workers in the RGSS or RTMC, while
they are very weakly related to true earnings for workers in the RESS because of the presence of
both legislated tariﬀs and widespread tax fraud.
RGSS and RTMC
To deal with the top-censoring problem, we proceed as follows. First we estimate a Tobit model for
covered earnings. Then we use the estimated parameters to impute the earnings of the censored
observations and estimate an earning function using imputed earnings for those aﬀected by the
ceilings. Finally, we generate “true earnings” for all the individuals in the top censored groups, by
using the estimated regression function and adding an individual random noise component.
From the individual proﬁle of covered earnings ct between year T ¡k and year T we impute the
individual proﬁle of “true” real earnings (wt, t = T ¡k;:::;T). Given this information, we project
earnings forward and backward in the following way.
² Forward: here we assume zero real growth, hence ˆ wT+m = wT for m = 1;:::;M.
² Backward: ˆ wT¡k¡l = wT¡k + g(aT¡k¡l) for l = 1;:::;L. The function g(¢) corrects for the
growth of log earnings imputable to age a and is deﬁned as:
g(aT¡k¡l) = ¯1 ¤ aT¡k¡l + ¯2 ¤ a2
T¡k¡l ¡ ¯1 ¤ aT¡k ¡ ¯2 ¤ a2
T¡k:
The ¯’s are the estimated coeﬃcients from a ﬁxed eﬀects earnings equation, the details of
which are available upon request. The correction is speciﬁc for each combination of sex and
contributive group.
We further correct backwards the log of average earnings to control for the variation of the
average productivity of the Spanish Economy in the period 1960-1985, that is the time horizon
of our backward projection.
RESS
As already pointed out, for individuals enrolled in the RESS, covered earnings are very weakly
related to true earnings. The self-employed are free to choose their beneﬁt base between an annual
ﬂoor and a ceiling and, practically, all of them choose the ﬂoor, as conﬁrmed by Table ?? which
displays the fraction of self-employed contributing the minimum (censored from below) or the
maximum (censored from above) for the years 1986 and 1995 respectively. This implies that there
is no way in which true earnings for the self-employed can be recovered from the HLSS data set.3 KEY INGREDIENTS OF THE RETIREMENT MODELS 12
We are therefore forced to assume that the earnings and the contributive proﬁle coincide. Thus,
we project (real) earnings given the observed proﬁle of (real) contributions as follows:
² Backward: wt¡k¡l = ct¡k, for l = 1;:::;L,
² Forward: wt+m = ct(1 + g)m, for m = 1;:::;M with g = 0:005.
In other words, we assume that contributions were constant up to the ﬁrst time they are observed,
while they grow at a constant annual rate of 0.5 percent thereafter.
It is important to recall, from Section 2, that current Spanish legislation allows the self-employed
to begin drawing retirement pensions without retiring, at least as long as they keep managing their
own business. Hence, in the dynamic choice of the self-employed, the opportunity cost of retiring is
not measured by the loss of future earnings but, instead, by the fact that contributions cannot longer
be accumulated to increase future pensions, and marginal income taxes must be paid on pensions.
This implies that, for the self-employed, maximization of the (net of taxes) Social Security payoﬀ
is a very reasonable objective function.
3.3 Evaluation of Social Security incentives
Assumptions
For every male worker in the “wage sample” who is enrolled either in the RGSS or in the RETA we
assume that: (i) he is married to a nonworking spouse, (ii) his wife is three years younger, and (iii)
his mortality corresponds to the baseline male mortality from the most recent available life tables
(INE, 1995).
For every female in the “wage sample” we assume that: (i) she is married to either a retiree or
a worker entitled to retirement beneﬁts, (ii) her husband is four years older, and (iii) her mortality
is the baseline female mortality from the most recent available life tables (INE, 1995).
For both men and women we further assume that: (iv) starting at age 55 and until age 65, there
are three pathways to retirement: the UB52+ program, DI beneﬁts and early retirement. At each
age, an individual has an age-speciﬁc probability of entering retirement using any of these three
programs. However the following restrictions are important in characterizing the actual usage of
the three pathways to retirement:
1. No person has access to early retirement before age 60.
2. After age 60, a person cannot claim UB52+ and can only claim early retirement or DI beneﬁts.
3. A self-employed person enrolled in RETA can never claim UB52+ beneﬁts.
This implies that, in practice, pathways for retirement are relatively simple. For people in the
RGSS either they retire before 60 via the UB52+ or the DI beneﬁts program or they retire after
60 via the DI (most unlikely, though, since 1992) or the R program. People in the RESS either go
via the DI beneﬁts or the R program, with the likelihood of the former being low and decreasing
from age 60 onward.3 KEY INGREDIENTS OF THE RETIREMENT MODELS 13
Calculating SS incentives
For a worker of age a, we deﬁne social security wealth (SSW) in case of retirement at age h ¸ a as





Here S is the age of certain death, ½s = ¯s¡a¼s, with ¯ denoting the pure time discount factor
and ¼s the conditional survival probability at age s for an individual alive at age a, and Bs(h) the
pension expected at age s ¸ h + 1 in case of retirement at age h. Given SSW, we deﬁne three
incentive variables for a worker of age a:
1. Social security accrual (SSA) is the diﬀerence in SSW from postponing retirement from age
a to age a + 1
SSAa = SSWa+1 ¡SSWa =
S X
s=a+2
½s[Bs(a + 1) ¡ Bs(a)] ¡ ½a+1Ba+1(a):
The SSA is positive if the expected present value
PS
s=a+2 ½s[Bs(a+1)¡Bs(a)] of the increment
in the ﬂow of pension beneﬁts is greater than the expected present value ½a+1Ba+1(a) of the
pension beneﬁt foregone by postponing retirement. If the increments Bs(a + 1) ¡ Bs(a) are
small, as it is usually the case, then the SSA is negative. The re-scaled negative accrual
¿a = ¡SSAa =Wa+1, where Wa+1 equals expected net earnings at age a + 1 based on the
information available up to age a, is called the implicit tax/subsidy on postponing retirement
from age a to age a + 1.
2. Peak value PVa = maxhfSSWh ¡SSWag, h = a+1;:::;R, where R is a mandatory retirement
age (which does not exist in Spain, but given the retirement evidence we ﬁnd it reasonable to
assume R = 70). Thus, the peak value is the maximum diﬀerence in SSW between retiring
at any future age and retiring at age a.














is the total expected utility of retiring at age h > a. Thus, the option value is the maximum
utility diﬀerence between retiring at any future age and retiring at age a. We parameterize
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If expected earnings are constant at Wa (as assumed by our earnings model), then
Vh ¡ Va = Wa
h X
s=a+1
½s + 1:25(SSWh ¡SSWa);
that is, the peak value and the option value are proportional to each other except for the
eﬀect due to the term
Ph
s=a+1 ½s.
The restrictions embodied in assumption (iv) above require us to combine the incentive measures
Ij from the various programs (j = UB, DI, R, where UB denotes unemployment beneﬁts, DI






a IDI + IUB(1 ¡ pDI
a ); if 55 · a < 60,
pDI
a IDI + IR(1 ¡ pDI
a ); if 60 · a < 65,
IR; if 65 ¸ a,
where pDI
a denotes the probability of observing a transition from employment into disability at age
a. Since the self-employed have no access to UB52+ beneﬁts, the combined incentives from age 55
to age 59 for members of this group change to
I = pDI
a IDI + IR(1 ¡ pDI
a ); 55 · a · 59:
We have followed a regression based approach to compute the unconditional probability of
qualifying for a disability pension (see Boldrin et al. [2001b] for a description).
3.4 The reduced form retirement model
This section brieﬂy illustrates the explanatory power of our incentive measures (accrual, peak
value, and option value) for retirement behavior. The results reported here are distilled from the
extensive econometric analysis conducted in Boldrin et al. [2001b], to which the reader is referred
for all relevant details.
We follow a regression based approach to model the eﬀect of Social Security wealth, incen-
tive measure (either accrual, peak or option value) and individual demographic characteristics on
the decision to retire in year 1995 conditional on being active at the end of 1994. Retirement
probabilities are assumed to have the probit form
PrfRi = 1g = Φ(±1 SSWi +±2Ii + ±0
3Xi);
where R is a binary indicator of retirement, Φ is the distribution function of a standard normal,
I denotes the incentive measure, and X is a vector of predictors which include individual earnings
and socio-demographic characteristics. The socioeconomic and earnings information is richer for
the RGSS than for the RETA. This, coupled with the widespread mis-reporting of earnings that
characterizes the aﬃliates to RETA, makes a quantitative analysis of their retirement patterns a
very diﬃcult task. Regression results for RETA, in fact, are much poorer than those for RGSS
and, in any case, should be taken with caution.
For each one of the three incentive measures (accrual, peak and OV) we have used the following
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² An eligibility dummy for attainment of a minimum of 15 years of contributions; three industry-
speciﬁc variables: the fraction of collective wage settlements having a clause favoring early
retirement, the presence of rules permitting retirement at age 64 without any age penalty,
and the existence of mandatory retirement at age 65; to measure seniority on the job and in
the labor market we have used the length of the current employment spell and its square,
the number of years of contribution and its square, the number of years of potential experi-
ence; dummies for schooling level and the contributive group (only for people in the RGSS);
dummies for part-time work and the sector of occupation (only for people in the RGSS); the
expected wage and our estimate of the lifetime earnings net present value and their squares;
the net present value of expected wages until the year in which either the peak value or the
option value reach their maximum.
A summary of estimation results
The results obtained for each incentive measure are presented, separately by sex and Social Security
regime, in Table 3. The model has been ﬁt to the observed transitions between 1994 and 1995.
We show, for each combination of sex and regime, the estimates of the probit coeﬃcients, their
estimated standard errors and the implied probability eﬀect. Since we report the results from a
large number of models, we concentrate on the variables of interest. The complete set of results is
available from the authors upon request.
The SSW term is positive and signiﬁcant in all cases. Contradictory results are obtained instead
for the three incentive variables. In fact, while the accrual usually shows the expected (negative)
sign, both the peak and the option value show the wrong (positive) sign. Further, neither SSW nor
the incentive variables are signiﬁcant for people enrolled in RETA, indicating that the SSW and the
ﬁnancial variables do not capture retirement incentives for individual enrolled in RETA. Measures of
ﬁtness, as the R2 are either mediocre or poor, suggesting that a great deal of retirement variability
cannot be captured by our incentive indicators. This is particularly true for people enrolled in
the special regimes (RETA). These, relatively poor results are discussed at length in Boldrin et
at. [2001b] and we will not go back to them here. They do suggest, though, that the quantitative
impact that a change in the ﬁnancial incentives may have on the predicted retirement behavior, is
bound to be either negligible or small. The implied probability eﬀects are minuscule, implying that
only abnormally large variations in the incentive measures may be able to have a quantitatively
sizable eﬀect on early retirement. As a consequence of this fact, when evaluating the policy reforms
we concentrate our attention mostly on changes in SSW and on the eﬀect of variables other than the
pure ﬁnancial incentive variables. As the forthcoming analysis underlines, reforming the legislated




The main aim of this paper is to investigate the budgetary implications of pension system reforms.
In the simulations we consider ﬁve policies, of which the last two are speciﬁc to the Spanish case:
R1: 3-year reform. A reform of the existing system consisting of a three-year increase in both
the Early and the Normal Retirement Age (or ERA and NRA respectively), while keeping all
other aspects of the Spanish SS system unchanged.4 SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 16
R2: Actuarial Adjustment reform. This reforms introduces the following change to the base
Spanish pension system: a 6% annual actuarial adjustment per year away from the Normal
Retirement Age. Beneﬁts become available at the existing ERA (60), and retirements after
the NRA receive a positive 6% adjustment per year. This actuarial adjustment is also applied
to disability beneﬁts.
R3: Common reform. This reform implies the following changes to the base system: (i) ERA
at 60, (ii) NRA at 65, (iii) a replacement rate at age 65 equal to 60 percent of the gross
(but net of the employers contributions) average lifetime earnings (on the best 40 earnings
years before retirement or the ﬁrst age of elegibility, whatever comes ﬁrst), and an actuarial
adjustment of 3.6 percent per year from age 60 to age 70 (this implies a replacement rate of
42 percent at age 60 and 78 percent at age 70). Notice that (i) and (ii) correspond to the
current Spanish system, whereas the actuarial adjustment for retirement before age 65 is less
favorable than the one currently used in Spain. Also, the current Spanish system is more
generous for retirement at age 65 and has no actuarial adjustment for postponing retirement
after that age.
R97: The retirement regime created by the 1997 Spanish reform.
R97 + A02: The previous regime as altered by the amendment introduced in 2002.
We recall that the 1997 reform, described in Section 2, implies the following changes in the
basic beneﬁt formula and in the penalties related to age and contributive history: (i) the number
of years of contribution used to construct the beneﬁt base is increased from 8, as prescribed by the
1985 legislation, to 15, (ii) workers retiring after the age of 60 with 40 or more contributive years
are charged an actuarial adjustment of only 7 percent (instead of 8 percent) for each year under age
65, (iii) the penalty for insuﬃcient contributions is such that the replacement rate (ratio between





0; if n < 15,
:5 + :03(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 25,
:8 + :02(n ¡ 25); if 25 · n < 35,
1; if 35 · n,
The 2002 amendment has introduced the following changes, which are also illustrated above in
Section 2: (i) a generalized penalization rule for early retirement, starting at age 61; (ii) a new
incentive scheme for those retiring after the age 65 with, at least, 35 years of contributions; (iii) an
increase in survivor beneﬁts.
For each of the ﬁve policies we carry out the following simulation:
S2: Starting from the basic reduced form model for retirement, we modify the SSW and incentive
measures according to the assumed policy changes. We also change the probabilities of
receiving DI beneﬁts, by setting them to zero after age 60, but leave untouched the coeﬃcients
on the age dummies.
Setting to zero the probability of using the DI beneﬁts after age 60 has a very negligible impact,
as these are already extremely small to begin with.
For the policy reform denoted R1 we also carry out a second simulation, which aims at quanti-
fying the impact that a change in the legislated ERA and NRA would have on total expenditure.4 SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 17
S3: In addition to the changes described in S2, we also shift the coeﬃcients on the age dummies
by three years, so that the entire age-proﬁle of the retirement hazard shifts forward by three
years. Speciﬁcally, in the calculation of SSW we increase by three years the early and the
normal retirement ages, and shift by three years the age-speciﬁc probability of receiving DI-UI
beneﬁts.
4.2 Simulation sample
We use individuals born in 1940 (aged 55 in 1995) extracted from the sample described above,
since the zero real growth assumption seems to be very unrealistic for younger cohorts. We have
concentrated on workers enrolled in either the General Regime (RGSS) and the Self-employed
regime (RETA). These two groups cover practically 90 percent of the aﬃliates to the Spanish
Social Security.
Given that the base sample (HLSS) is not completely representative of the regional distribu-
tion of Spanish employment, we have constructed a balanced random sample by sampling (with
replacement) from the HLSS using the population weights of the six territorial areas in which Spain
is divided by EPA (Labor Force Survey). The re-balancing procedure has been further reﬁned by
taking into account, within each of the six regions, the composition of the labor force by sex and
by contributive regime. In a second step ,weights have been assigned to each observation in order
to replicate the population number of workers born in 1940 who where active in the labor market
in 1995 (farmers and civil servants excluded).
4.3 Baseline case and family assumptions
Our baseline case makes the same assumptions as in Boldrin et al. [2001b] with regard to interest
and mortality rates. The other assumptions are illustrated next.
Marital status assumptions
We have used family data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA) to obtain information on
the marital status of individuals born in 1940. The main ﬁndings, which we try to replicate in our
simulations, are the following:
² Male: 95 percent married and 5 percent single. Among those married, 75.2 percent have
a non-working spouse and the rest a working spouse. In both cases the (average) spouse is
born in 1943 (aged 52).
² Female: 74 percent married and 26 percent single. Among those married, 34.5 have a
non-working spouse (presumably retired) and the rest a working spouse. In both cases the
(average) spouse was born in 1937 (aged 58).
Two remarks are relevant with respect to the way in which the beneﬁts of survivorship are
handled in the simulation exercises.
a) Since survivor and retirement beneﬁts are fully compatible (up to the amount of the maximum
pension) there is no necessity to correct for double counting in the Spanish case. Whenever the
maximum pension ceiling is supposed to take eﬀect, this is applied to the total pension payments
accruing to the survivor.4 SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 18
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Figure 1: Average number of dependants by region and sex of aﬃliated individual
b) Survivor beneﬁts accruing to members of the 1940 cohort in force of their having a working
spouse are not accounted for (i.e. are not included in the computation of the SSW for a member of
the 1940 cohort) since they are included in the computation of beneﬁts for the cohort the spouse
belongs to.
Dependant assumptions
As noted previously, our data set does not provide suﬃcient information either on marital status
or on the number and age of dependants. In our projections we handle this inconvenience by
using information extracted from the Spanish Labor Survey over the 1995-2001 period. From
such data we compute the average number of dependants (per worker) in each of the six regions
(Catalonia, South, Centre or Castilla, Madrid, East and North). We also distinguish by sex and
age of the individual worker. In other words, we assume that the factors determining the number
of dependants are: age, sex and region of residence. Then we regress the data so collected, for each
one of the seven years comprised by the EPA sample, and for each region of residence and sex cell,
with respect to the age of the worker and its square. Next, we use these regressions to predict,
for people born in 1940, the average number of dependants when they reach the age between 55
and 70. After that age we assume that the number of dependants (spouse excluded) drops to zero.
Figure 1 reports the results of the analysis by region and sex.
In order to impute the beneﬁts for dependants in the calculation of the SSW, we assume that
all of them receive the legislated minimum (see Boldrin et al. [2001a] for data and legislation).4 SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 19
4.4 Computing expected expenditure for those that retire before 55
The target here is to estimate the total expenditure for pension payments to those members of
the 1940 cohort that retired before the year 1995 (i.e. before reaching the age of 55) and whose
retirement behavior we will not try to model. While during the 1980s and early 1990s the number of
Spanish workers retiring before age 55 was considerable, this practice has been dropping remarkably
fast during the last decade. As we have already pointed out elsewhere, this is due to a substantial
tightening of the requirements for accessing DI beneﬁts and the sharp reduction in the usage of
subsidized early retirement as an instrument for handling industrial restructuring.
The relevant information in our sample has the following form. We have the information on
the initial beneﬁts for all the workers belonging to the 1940 cohort who retired before 1998 (age
58). This allows us to reconstruct the SSW of those workers in pesetas of the reference year (1995
in our case). To proceed further and extracting the SSW (in 1995) of all those in the 1940 cohort
who had already retired at the time, we need a couple of additional assumptions
² Anybody retiring before the age of 55 did it through the DI program.
² None of the ﬁve reforms being considered will aﬀect the beneﬁts of those workers who retire
before the age of 55 by means of the DI program.
² The marital status and the number of dependant entitled to beneﬁts for people in this group
are the same as for the average member of the cohort.
This allows us to estimate the (after income taxes) net present value, in million of 2001 Euros,
of the SSW attributable to members of the 1940 cohort who retired before the age of 55. This is
EURO 1,360.4 and 289.6, for male and females, respectively. These values are to be added to those
obtained in tables 13 and 14.
4.5 Computing expected expenditure
Our aim is to compute the lifetime NPV of the pension expenditure for a given cohort C aged
a in year t. We are endowed with a sample of N observations from which we want to project
expenditure for a working population of size M. There are two ways of leaving the labor force:
retirement and death. Under such circumstances, the expected net present value of the beneﬁts





hi]; i = 1;::;N
where phi(R;X) and phi(d;X) are, respectively, the conditional probabilities (at age a) of re-
tirement and death at age h. Both or them may depend or not from individual characteristics
(X). In our exercise the retirement probabilities do depend on individual characteristics and the
probability of dying does not (except for the sex of the individual). Obviously, the retirement
probabilities at each age depend on individual characteristics in accordance with the retirement
probabilities estimated above.
Selecting the adequate weights (which depend on individual characteristics) for each observation
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where Wi(X) is the share of individuals of type i in the population, according to the vector of
characteristics X.




NPV TPi ¢ Wi(X); i = 1;::;N
where the net present value of Social Security contributions for an individual of type i in cohort




(1 ¡ phi(R;X) ¡ phi(d;X))Cd
hi);
and Cd
hi are the social security contributions paid at age h by and individual of type i.
Finally, the projected expenditure (beneﬁts - taxes) is given by
NPV PEC = NPV BPC ¡ NPV TPC
4.6 Elevation to the population
As noted previously (see Boldrin et al. [2001b]) the HLSS data source is not completely represen-
tative of the Spanish population. In Table 4 we present the set of population factors we have used
in order to make our sample representative of the working population under study. The source of
the weights is the 2nd quarter wave of the 1995 Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA). We distinguish
individuals according to two Social Security regimes (RGSS, RETA), six regions (Catalonia, South,
Centre or Castilla, Madrid, East and North) and by their sex, for a total of twenty four diﬀerent
types.
4.7 Income tax and indirect taxes
A full evaluation of the ﬁscal impact of a social security reform cannot be restricted to the impact
that the latter may have on the budget of the Social Security Administration alone. While in many
countries, Spain being one of them, the Social Security Administration formally runs a separate
budget from that of the central government, such separation is only formal and continuously violated
in practical circumstances. So, for example, in the Spanish system the employees of the central
government belong to a pension system that is managed directly by the Spanish Treasury and
which is ﬁnanced by general taxation. While the RGSS has been running a current account surplus
during the last few years this was not the case in the past and, most likely, will not be the case
again in the near future. In previous years, the annual deﬁcits of the RGSS (and of the various
regimes listed in the RESS) were covered by transfers from the central government. In fact, part
of the current surplus of the RGSS is due to the fact that, progressively, since the 1985 reform a
number of functions pertaining originally to the RGSS have been transferred or are being ﬁnanced
directly by general taxation (INSERSO, non contributive pensions, part of the minimum pension
payments, some disability payments, etcetera). More generally, it is quite obvious that surpluses
and deﬁcits of the public pension system are surpluses and deﬁcits of the central government which
guarantees the payment of future pensions via its power of taxation and which considers the net
present value of current and future pension entitlements as part of the public debt. This implies
that a full picture of the ﬁscal eﬀect of a reform can be achieved only by adding to the net present5 RESULTS 21
value calculations we just illustrated, the impact of changing work and retirement patterns on other
sources of ﬁscal revenues.
Among the latter, income taxes clearly take the lion share. By retiring, not only an individual
stops contributing to the pension system and starts drawing a pension; it also starts paying income
taxes on a pension which is usually substantially smaller than the previous labor income. This
eﬀect is further magniﬁed by the existence, in many countries, of a strongly progressive income
taxation and a number of exemptions for low incomes, among which pensions loom large, at least
in the case of Spain. Finally, moving from work to retirement implies also a number of changes in
the consumption habits of an individual, which may also aﬀect his or her exposure to other forms of
taxation, such as VAT. While we do take this eﬀect into account in our estimations, a word of caution
should be added. Most of the VAT impact is due not so much to changes in the composition of
consumption baskets (VAT rates are fairly homogenous) but to the lower income level of pensioners.
One is therefore lead to assume, as we do here, that a relatively stable relationship exists between
income and sales/consumption taxes. While this may be a correct ﬁrst order approximation, it
should be interpreted with care as it may easily overestimate the reduction in indirect taxation
that follows retirement. The reason is obvious: VAT is a consumption tax, hence the portion of
disposable income which is saved is not burdened with VAT. Saving propensities drop substantially
after retirement, which may imply that the amount of VAT paid, as a percentage of one’s income
or income taxes does not stay constant bur increases after retirement.
These caveats notwithstanding, we proceeded as follows. For each individual in the 1940 cohort,
and for each age from 55 onward, we computed the total income taxes paid; that is the sum of the
income taxes paid as an active worker (assuming that our estimated labor income at that age, and
in that year coincided with the totality of his/her income) and as a retiree (again, assuming the
pension received coincided with her/his total income). Additionally, we have tried to impute the
VAT taxes paid starting from the income taxes and multiplying by a VAT factor deﬁned as :
V AT = PT=T
where PT consists of VAT plus other sale and consumption taxes, and T are total income
taxes. The resulting VAT factor, using National Accounts data for 1995-2001 (source: Bank of
Spain website www.bde.es) is 0.92.
The total tax receipts from a pension system, ignoring the general equilibrium eﬀects, are
therefore given by:
Total Taxes = SS contribution + (1+ VAT) Income Taxes
The diﬀerence between the above quantity under the base case pension system and any pension
reform gives the ﬁscal impact of that reform.
5 Results
Overall the results are mixed and, in a sense we should make clear as we proceed with the discus-
sion, not fully satisfactory. Recall our distinction (see introduction) between a mechanical and a
behavioral eﬀect of a policy reform. As we argued there, to the extent that individuals which are
in the middle, or toward the end, of their working history are faced with a change of rules to which
they cannot respond appropriately, the ﬁrst eﬀect is always present. The second will come around
only if two conditions are simultaneously realized: (i) the reform aﬀects the ﬁnancial incentives
to either retire or continue working; (ii) people respond strongly to variations in such ﬁnancial
incentives.5 RESULTS 22
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Basically, as one would have expected from the low ability of our reduced form estimations to
capture the variability of retirement behaviors, while the ﬁve reforms do aﬀect the two incentive
indicators, the latter do not induce strong behavioral responses on the part of workers. More
precisely, the fraction of workers whom, we estimate, would postpone retirement age is quite small,
and the number of years by which retirement is postponed is also small. As a consequence, the
overall ﬁscal impact of the various reforms is due mostly to the mechanical component, with little
being added by the change in workers’ behavior. While this statement should (and will, see the
analysis of individual reforms, regime by regime, in the rest of this section) be qualiﬁed, we think
it summarizes decently well the overall picture. We are inclined to say that, if our estimations of
the behavior of Spanish workers past age 55 were to be taken at their face value, then the most
eﬀective way of postponing retirement would be, simply, to legislate a shift in the early and normal
retirement ages, without bothering to modify the other rules.
5.1 Results by regime and gender
Notice ﬁrst that the results are pretty homogeneous across sexes. So, while we present the details
of the simulation separately for males and females, our comments cover both groups without dis-
tinguishing among them. Obviously, as female’s labor force participation is still substantially low
in Spain, the actual magnitude involved are rather diﬀerent between men and women.5 RESULTS 23
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We begin our analysis of results from the RGSS. Figure 2 reports SSW by age. We have collected
the ﬁve reforms in three groups, one for each panel; to allow for easiness of comparison with the
status quo, the latter is reported in each panel. In the ﬁrst panel we compare the status quo with
the R1 reform in its two versions, S2 and S3. As S3 diﬀers from S2 only in the retirement hazard,
SSW estimates are identical. They are both lower than in the base case, especially at the crucial
ages 55 to 65. The reduction is substantial and, in particular, this reform also shifts forward the
SSW age proﬁle, in such a way that the maximum is now reached at a later age, around 65-67
instead of the current 63-65. A similar, but somewhat less strong reduction in SSW is obtained
by the Common Reform R3, while the impact of the Actuarial Adjustment reform, R2, is small.
Further, neither R2 nor R3 succeed at shifting forward the age at which SSW is maximized, thereby
leaving this incentive to retirement basically unaltered. Things are even less satisfactory for the
two Spanish reforms, R97 and R97&A02, reported in the third panel: the age proﬁle of SSW is left
unchanged by these reforms. This behavior of the SSW indicator is reﬂected in that of (cumulated)
taxes paid at each retirement age, which are reported in Figure 4. The aggregate behavior seems
simple enough to be understandable without comments. The disaggregation of the ﬁscal impact
of reforms is discussed below. In the two upper panels of Figures 8, 9, and 10 we report, by age
and for each reform, the estimated total change in gross and net SSW. The reader should not be
confused by the diﬀerent scales used in the various panels. The top two panels of Figure 8 show
that the impact of R1 is much stronger on gross SSW under S3 than S2, while the result is mixed,
or even reversed, for net SSW. The impact of R2 is either irrelevant (as it reduces gross SSW
only for people retiring very late, while at the same time increasing their net SSW) or it goes in
the wrong direction, slightly increasing SSW at earlier retirement ages. Reform R3, instead, does
reduce SSW substantially at the normal retirement age and, by an almost negligible amount, at
earlier dates (Figure 9, top panels). Finally, top panels of Figure 10, the two Spanish reforms seem
to cause a negligible, and most of the time undesired, eﬀect on SSW wealth at all retirement ages
considered.
The impact of the ﬁve reforms on the distribution of retirement ages can be found in Figure
6, which is also structured in three panels to facilitate comparison. Results are straightforward:
R97 and R97&A02 have no impact on retirement ages; both the Actuarial Adjustment and the
Common Reform shift the distribution only very mildly to the right, making the peak at age 65
more pronounced. The R1 reform has a much stronger impact, in the S3 version in particular, on
the distribution of retirement ages. This is not very surprising. The current peaks at 60 and 65
are moved to 63 and 68, respectively, while the rest remains roughly the same.
Let us now consider closely the ﬁscal impact of the various reforms. This can be done by
studying Tables 5-8. A large amount of information is reported in this tables, hence we outline
only the main features. In Tables 5 and 6 we have reported, for each reform, a breakdown of
the diﬀerent components of the total ﬁscal impact: reduction in beneﬁts, increase in payroll taxes,
variation in income and VAT taxes. The breakdown is calculated separately for male (5) and female
(6) workers, and using two diﬀerent ﬁnancial measures of retirement incentives, the peak and option
values. Tables 7 and 8 summarize, for males and females respectively, the decomposition of the
ﬁscal eﬀects into the behavioral and the mechanical components, which are discussed earlier in the
chapter and in the introduction to this volume. The main ﬁndings are strikingly simple. First oﬀ,
neither of the two Spanish reforms make any diﬀerence3, variations are of the same magnitude of
3See Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın (1999) or Ab´ ıo et al. (1999) for previous evaluations of that reform. In both cases the
estimated eﬀects are of small magnitude5 RESULTS 26
rounding errors, and are completely accounted for by the sample uncertainty of our estimations.
Among the other three reforms, the Common Reform is the one with largest negative impact on
both beneﬁts paid to retirees and tax revenues; the total eﬀect on government revenues is positive
because the drop in beneﬁts is about three times larger than the drop in tax revenues (Tables
7 and 8). While the quantities estimated diﬀer, both the option and the peak value indicators
provide the same ranking of eﬀects, and the estimated changes in government revenues and outlays
are comparable. Next, in terms of total impact, comes the R1 reform under the S3 simulation
procedure, i.e. assuming that retirement ages are eﬀectively shifted three years down, pretty much
by ﬁat. This reform also yields an important improvement of the government net position; most of
it comes from a reduction in the net present value of beneﬁts, with a small residual due to increase
in total taxation. In particular, the substantial increase in payroll contributions generated by the
longer work-life is almost completely balanced by the reduction in income and VAT revenues that
the reform induces. Next, in terms of change in the ﬁscal position, is the R1 reform as estimated
under the S2 hypothesis; directions of change are the same as in the S3 version but, obviously,
the quantities are much smaller. Finally, R2 is predicted to have a negative impact on the ﬁscal
position of government as the small increase in tax revenues it induces is more than compensated
by an increase in beneﬁts paid, leading to a small but visible worsening of the government net
position.
A second look at table 6 also shows that, as anticipated earlier, the behavioral impact of the
reforms we consider is rather limited. Most of the savings comes from the mechanical aspects of the
change, i.e. the fact that by suddenly reducing beneﬁts or lenghtening working lifes one captures
the workers “oﬀ-guard”, especially the older workers, and this leads to substantial savings for the
public purse. For this reason, mechanical eﬀects are orders of magnitude larger than the behavioral
ones, uniformly across reforms and independently of the ﬁnancial indicator adopted. Notice that, at
least in the case of R3 and R1+S3, the relative reduction of government net outlays is substantial,
oscillating between -18.0 and -30.0 percent, depending on the ﬁnancial indicator adopted.
5.1.2 RESS
Move next to estimates for workers enrolled in the special regimes, of which RETA is by far the
most important, and upon which most of our data rely upon. Results here are dirtier, especially
when it comes to forecasting the impact of each speciﬁc reform on retirement patterns by age.
This is due, as discussed above, to the very low explanatory power of our ﬁnancial measures of
incentive to retirement, which in the case of the self-employed capture a small portion of the actual
retirement patterns. In any case, the analysis proceeds in the same fashion as for the RGSS and
results are organized likewise. Figure 3 reports SSW by age. In the ﬁrst panel we compare the
status quo with the R1 reform in its two versions, S2 and S3. They are both somewhat lower
than in the base case, and keep the same ﬂat age proﬁle, dropping slightly after the age of 63.
A remarkably strong reduction of SSW is obtained by the Common Reform R3 while, as in the
RGSS case, the impact of R2 is small. Again, the two Spanish reforms, R97 and R97&A02, do
not seem to be doing particularly well; nevertheless, for RESS aﬃliates, the two reforms decrease
rather than increasing gross SSW. The proﬁles for total (cumulated) tax payments at diﬀerent ages,
reported in Figure 5, are essentially undistinguishable from the base case, exception made for R3,
which generates a visible decrease in total tax payments. In the two lower panels of Figures 8, 9,
and 10, the same kind of information is reported, only more detailed. In Figure 8 we see that, as
for RGSS, the impact of R1 on gross SSW is substantially stronger under S3 than S2, and that,
contrary to RGSS, the same ranking of relative impact applies to net SSW. The impact of R2 is5 RESULTS 27
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either irrelevant (as it reduces SSW only for people retiring either very early or very late) or it goes
in the wrong direction, slightly increasing SSW at currently observed retirement ages (between 60
and 69). Reform R3, instead, does reduce SSW substantially and across the whole spectrum of
possible retirement ages, with a somewhat stronger impact at 60 and 65. (Figure 9, bottom panels).
Finally, bottom panels of Figure 10, the two Spanish reforms appear to have a small impact, in the
correct direction, on the SSW of self-employed people, in particular before and around the normal
retirement age of 65. It is important to notice, though, that the amounts involved in this case are
quite small, and that the likely impact on retirement behavior is probably negligible.
The likely eﬀect of the ﬁve reforms on the distribution of retirement ages can be found in Figure
7. Results in this case seems to be slightly more positive than in the RGSS case, but only by small
amounts. The two Spanish reforms, R97 and R97&A02, appear to have some impact on retirement
ages, which are pushed slightly to the right; the Actuarial Adjustment instead does not shift the
distribution of retirement ages, while the Common Reform moves it visibly to the right, making
the peak at age 65 even more pronounced than it already is. The R1 reform has a strong impact,
in particular in the S3 version. Compared to the RGSS case of Figure 6, the impact is weaker, still
it is the most substantial among those produced by the ﬁve reform scenarios.
Finally, we can see the disaggregation of the ﬁscal eﬀects in Tables 9-12. As before for the RGSS,
in Tables 9 and 10 we have reported, for each reform, a breakdown of the diﬀerent components of the
total ﬁscal impact: reduction in beneﬁts, increase in payroll taxes, variation in income and VAT
taxes. The breakdown is calculated separately for male (9) and female (10) workers, and using
two diﬀerent ﬁnancial measures of retirement incentives, the peak and option values. Similarly,
in Tables 11 and 12 we report, for males and females respectively, the decomposition between
mechanical and behavioral components. There are quantitative, but not qualitative, diﬀerences
with the RGSS case described earlier (Tables 5-8). The two Spanish reforms now have a somewhat
more visible impact on the ﬁscal position, which (Tables 11 and 12) is now predicted to improve
slightly. The magnitudes involved, though, are quite small (less than 5 percentage points) and may
still be accounted for by the sample uncertainty of our estimates. Among the other three reforms,
the Common Reform is the one with largest negative impact on both beneﬁts paid to retirees and
tax revenues; the total eﬀect on government revenues is substantially positive. In fact, (Tables 11
and 12) the percentage variations involved are much larger (about twice the size) than those we
estimated for the RGSS. Next, in terms of total ﬁscal impact, comes the R1 reform under the S3
simulation procedure. This reform also yields an important improvement of the government net
position; slightly more than half of it comes from a reduction in the net present value of beneﬁts,
with the rest coming from an increase in taxation, in particular a substantial increase in payroll
contributions due to the longer work-life. Next is R1 under the S2 hypothesis; directions of change
are the same as in the S3 version but, obviously, the quantitative impact is much smaller are
people are not forced to shift ahead of three years that part of their retirement behavior which is
captured by age dummies. Finally, R2 is predicted to have a negative impact on the ﬁscal position
of government as the small increases in tax revenues it induces is more than compensated by an
increase in beneﬁts paid, leading to a small but visible worsening of the government net position.
5.2 1940 Cohort results for RGSS and RETA
A second look at table 6 also shows that, as anticipated earlier on, the behavioral impact of the
reform scenarios we consider is rather limited. Most of the savings come from the mechanical aspect
of the changes: reforms that unexpectedly reduce beneﬁts (such as the common reform) do have a
positive impact on the government ﬁscal position, while reform that legally force workers to retire5 RESULTS 32
later, like the R1 especially in the R3 simulation, have a strong impact on retirement patterns and,
consequently, beneﬁts paid out. For this reason, mechanical eﬀects are orders of magnitude larger
than the behavioral ones, uniformly across reforms and independently of the ﬁnancial indicator
adopted. Notice that, at least in the case of R3 and R1+S3, the relative reduction of government
net outlays is substantial, oscillating between -18.0 and -30.0 percent, depending on the ﬁnancial
indicator adopted. These conclusions are summarized in Figure 12, which reports the total (RGSS
plus RESS) ﬁscal eﬀect of each reform on the Spanish government’s ﬁscal position. We distinguish,
in each case, between mechanical and behavioral eﬀect. The same information is reported, in
numerical form, in Tables 13 and 14. All the quantities reported in these tables and Figures, we
recall, are relative to the 1940 cohort; that is to say: we compute the positive/negative variations
in pension expenditure and tax revenues which are induced by applying each of the ﬁve reforms to
the 1940s cohort only. At the same time, it should also be noted that the numbers we report are
Net Present Value estimations, i.e. they correspond to the net present value, at the time of reform,
of the variations induced by the reform itself over the remaining life of the cohort. They do not
correspond, therefore, to variations in annual ﬂows.
Our model predicts that the two Spanish reforms, R97 and R97+A02, have a negligible total
ﬁscal eﬀect, that the Actuarial Adjustment (R2) reform would worsen the ﬁscal position of the
government, and that, ﬁnally, the R1 and the Common Reform (R3) would improve it. The largest
eﬀect is predicted for the R1 reform under the S3 simulation scenarios, i.e. when that portion of
current retirement patterns that is captured by age-dummies is shifted to the right of exactly three
years. The net amount saved, in this case, is substantial: about 0.80 percentage points of GDP.
In the other two cases, R1 without the impact of age dummies and R3, the amounts saved are
respectively around 0.35 and 0.55 percentage points of GDP. While these are large amounts, they
are not so large in relation either to the annual expenditure for Social Security pensions (which is
about 10 percentage points of GDP) or to the size of outstanding Spanish “pension debt”, which
is estimated to range around 200 percentage points of GDP. Even by multiplying these quantities
by a factor of ﬁfty (that is: even assuming that savings of similar size can be achieved during the
next ﬁfty year for each cohort born between 1940 and 1990) we would still be projecting total
savings equal to, at best, 20 percent of the outstanding pension debt. From this perspective, the
savings which can be achieved via the reforms considered here are somewhat modest and, probably,
still below the level which appears to be desirable. Finally, we should note that, in all cases but
R2 plus S3, most of the savings come from the mechanical aspect. Only R2+S3 shows a large
behavioral eﬀect, which is due to the fact that, by shifting the age-dummies to the right, we are in
fact assuming that Spanish workers will voluntarily choose to translate their age-related retirement
patterns forward of three years. One should keep in mind that, once a reform is implemented,
workers will adjust their behavior optimally (from their view point) to the changed circumstances.
After a few years, maybe a decade or slightly more, such adjustment is likely to eliminate or at
least greatly reduce the savings that accrue via the mechanical channel. This would leave, in the
long run, only with the behavioral channel. And, as we have seen, the savings one can obtain via
the behavioral channel are estimated to be quite small for each and everyone of the reforms we
have considered in this chapter. It is in this sense that, as mentioned at the beginning, we ﬁnd
the quantitative results of our exercise unsatisfactory and, in some sense, worrying. They say that,
to the extent one can predict using advanced econometric techniques, even serious and somewhat
draconian reforms of the Spanish pension system such as those considered here are not likely to
reduce pension expenditure of any signiﬁcant amount in the long-run.6 DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES 33
6 Distributional issues
Distributional and re-distributional issues always loom big in the discussions about pension reforms.
They also happen to be among the least simple to handle. To the extent that, given the historical
circumstances, all reform proposals aim at either reducing beneﬁts for future retirees or to postpone
the age of retirement or both, it is clear that some redistribution away from future retirees is being
planned. So much is clear, and the calculations reported in the previous section, especially at the
very end, summarizes the amount of redistribution planned, in the aggregate, from the retiring
cohort to the rest of society. The natural question, at this point, is one of equal treatment within
the retiring cohort: which group of workers, within the 1940’s cohort, is going to foot the bill? Is
the cut going to be uniform across sexes, educational levels, regime of aﬃliation, and so on?
It would be surprising if the kind of reforms we have been considering were aﬀecting all workers
in the same way and to the same extent. In fact, they do not. In order to provide a ﬁrst assessment
of such diﬀerential impact we have classiﬁed the individuals in our sample according to the quintile
of the Spanish labor income distribution to which they belong. We have then used the simulated
results from the various policy scenarios to estimate, in the usual manner, the impact that each
reform would have on the average member of each quintile. We measure the impact on both beneﬁts
and taxes. The summary measure is the net impact of the reform in both absolute and relative
terms. A summary of our ﬁndings is reported in Table 15 for the comparative reforms and Table
16 for the Spanish speciﬁc reforms.
Consider ﬁrst the three comparative reforms. The impression is striking. For all measures
of ﬁnancial incentives the burden of the reform falls rather unevenly on diﬀerent income groups.
More importantly: diﬀerent reforms aﬀect diﬀerent groups quite diﬀerently, so that some reforms
are “regressive” (redistribute away from the poorest quintiles more than from the richest quintiles)
and other “progressive” (do the opposite). The following is a summary of the distributional impact,
reform by reform.
R1: The reduction in the absolute amount of beneﬁts is monotone increasing from the lowest to
the highest quintile, and almost monotone as a percentage of current beneﬁts. The same is
true for the net change, which takes into account also the variations in contribution and taxes
the reform would bring about. The percentage reduction for people in the highest quintile,
though, is lower (about minus 10.0 percent) than for the second and third higher. From
the 12 percent reduction for the second quintile the eﬀect decreases to minus 9 percent for
the lowest. When the S3 shift is added (the R1-S3 case), then the reduction in gross and
net beneﬁts more than doubles. The progressivity, which was already very mild, disappears
almost completely in this case.
R2: The Actuarial Adjustment reform has a small but sizable reverse eﬀect on the net beneﬁts,
as the latter increase on average. It is also fairly regressive, as both the absolute value and
the percentage by which beneﬁts increase is actually decreasing with the level of earnings.
R3: As we pointed out, the Common Reform would imply a substantial cut of beneﬁts in the case
of Spain. While it changes retirement ages only partially, it cuts initial beneﬁts across the
board, and of an amount equal to roughly 30 percent of current pension payments. Together
with the forward shift in the early retirement age. which our model predicts as a consequence
of the reform, R3 has the eﬀect of drastically reducing the SSW wealth of the lowest paid
individuals. The amounts involved are very large, and they appear most deﬁnitely unrealistic,
at least from a socio-political point of view: a cut in net beneﬁts of about 50 percentage point7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 34
does not seem to be in the cards of any political coalition. Also in this as in the previous
case, the impact is regressive: higher paid workers would bear a smaller burden, at least in
percentage. In fact, the degree of regressivity that R3 displays is quite substantial.
The two Spanish reforms, we already pointed out, have a tiny and practically insigniﬁcant
aggregate impact. The same is true for the ﬁve quintiles.
R97; Beside doing little, which was already clear from the aggregate analysis, this is the only reform
which aﬀects almost all groups equally. If anything, it leans slightly more heavily on the lower
wage groups, like all other reforms but R1. In either case, the variations are estimated to be
of the order of plus or minus 1 percentage point of current beneﬁts.
R97&A02: In this case the aggregate impact is somewhat larger and the distributional one becomes
pronouncedly regressive. The total diﬀerence between the percentage gains of the highest
paid quintile (about 5 percentage points) and the losses of the lowest paid one (minus 2
percent) is quite large and, in some sense, surprising as the A02 modiﬁcation to the R97
reform was arranged and agreed upon, in some sense: requested by, the Spanish trade unions.
7 Concluding remarks
We summarize here the main ﬁndings, with an eye to policy implications and possible reforms. As
pointed out in the main text, some of the quantitative estimates reported should be taken with
(more than) the usual grain of salt as they are based on estimations of reduced form behavioral
equations that appear to have only a limited power to capture observed retirement patterns. This
caveat is particularly important for the aﬃliates to the RESS, for which none of the ﬁnancial
measures of retirement incentive seems to play a major role in aﬀecting decisions.
Once this is understood, our ﬁndings can be summarized, reform by reform, as follows.
The Actuarial Adjustment reform is probably the least eﬀective among the three comparison
reforms considered in the volume. This evaluation applies both in terms of expenditure, retirement
patterns, and redistributional eﬀect. Furthermore, most of the ﬁscal gains are accrued via the
mechanical channel, which suggests that little would be gained in the long run by implementing
the Actuarial Adjustment reform in Spain.
The 3-year shift reform may have an impact, which is likely to become quite strong if, by
changing legislation, one also aﬀects in the same direction the behavioral component of retirement
which seems to be captured purely by age dummies. In other words, if legislating that common
retirement age is 68 and no longer 65 as it is now, also leads most of the people that now use 65 as a
focus point to adopt 68 as a new focus age for retirement, then the gains in labor force participation
of the elderly achievable via the R1 scenario could be substantial. Correspondingly, also the ﬁscal
gains could be sizable even if, as we argued above, once we compare the magnitude of these ﬁscal
gains to the actual outstanding implicit social security debt of Spain, the actual reduction would
be likely to be around 15 percentage points at most. Further, some re-distributional aspects of
the R1 reform need to be adjusted to make it politically acceptable. The direction in which it
redistributes wealth, from the future retirees to the working population, is probably acceptable but
the distribution of that burden within the retiring cohorts seems much less acceptable as it falls
disproportionately on the lowest earning groups. This is an aspect which deserves further careful
examination.
The same goes for the Common Reform. The latter does not really shift retirement patterns
uniformly but, rather, cuts in a about a half the exit rate at age 60 (which corresponds to early7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 35
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retirement in Spain) and which is mostly used by the lower wage earners. At the same time, it
reduces beneﬁts, and therefore: outstanding SSW, quite drastically. Also this reform, like the
previous one, suﬀers of a very regressive bias which makes it politically unfeasible. The ﬁscal gains
accrued entails drastic reductions in the SSW wealth and in the yearly pension payments of workers
belonging to the lower 60 percent of the wage distribution.
The two Spanish reforms, both being currently implemented in Spain, are the least eﬀective
of the group. In both cases, the 1997 Reform and the latter plus the 2002 Amendment, the total
SSW varies very little, retirement patterns remain almost identical (a very mild shift to the right
is predicted for the RESS aﬃliates) and the net ﬁscal eﬀect is tiny. Also these reforms, though,
are regressive when one looks at within cohorts redistribution. The amount of regressivity is,
naturally, limited by the small reduction in aggregate SSW. Still, and quite paradoxically, the
2002 Amendment seems to make the overall Spanish reform more regressive than it was after the
1997 change. In any case, there is no reason to believe that the very minor improvement in the
government ﬁscal position that R97&A02 engenders will be suﬃcient to contain the forthcoming
Spanish pension deﬁcit.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 36
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A Data and Variables
In this section we deﬁne the variables that have been employed in the speciﬁcation of the reduced
form probit. The data source is the HLSS, unless we state otherwise.
Variables from HLSS
Experience, education and occupation.
² Spell: Length of the current spell in the data set.
² History: History in the data set, i.e. length of participation to the labor market.
² Part time: Indicator variable which takes the value one if the individual does not work full
time.
² Fraction working: History divided by potential experience (time elapsed since ﬁrst time
observed in the data set).
² Temporary illness: Length of history spent in temporary illness.
² Sector: 1-digit SIC industry classiﬁcation.
² Contributive group: 10 groups, from College to unskilled blue collars.A DATA AND VARIABLES 40
² Education: Proxy for the level of education, constructed as follows. All individuals in
contributive group 1 (i.e. college), are assigned to the college level of the educational variable.
People belonging to contributive groups 2, 3 and 4 are assigned to the high school (Diploma)
category. People in all other contributive groups are assigned to a generic class labelled “less
than high school”.
² Years of contributions: Number of years contributed.
² Eligibility indicator: A dummy variable which takes the value one if the individual meets
the contributive threshold (15 years of contributions); zero otherwise.
Earnings and pension variables.
² Covered earnings or pensionable earnings: Monthly amount upon which SS taxes are
levied.
² Monthly Earnings: Methods of computation (for workers in RGSS) is described in sec-
tion 3.2.
² Pension amount: See section 2 for a detailed description.
² Average life cycle earnings: Constructed on the basis of a ﬁxed eﬀect model, for each
contributive group.
² Expected earnings: See section 3.2 for a description.
² Expected earnings peak indicator: Discounted sum of the expected earning from the
present to the year the peak is reached.
² Expected earnings OV indicator: Discounted sum of the expected earning from the
present to the year the option value is maximized.
² Minimum pension indicator: A dummy variable which takes value one if the individual’s
expected retirement pension falls below the minimum retirement pension.
² Censoring earnings indicators: Two dummy variables. The ﬁrst takes value one if the
individual’s level of contributions falls below the minimum (mandatory) level of contribu-
tions. The second takes value one if the individual’s level of contribution is greater than the
maximum level of contributions.
Variables from the Collective Settlements Register (Estad´ ıstica de Convenios
Colectivos or ECC).
Since we do not have direct information about regulations aﬀecting speciﬁc workers, we use the
Spanish register of collective settlements in order to construct proxies for such regulations. In
particular, using the ECC [see Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın [1998] for a brief description of the source] we have
constructed three indicators of the coverage of early and mandatory retirement provisions for each
(2-digits) industry.
² Early retirement indicator: Fraction(weighted by employment) of collective settlements
including a provision favoring early retirement.A DATA AND VARIABLES 41
² Retirement at 64: Fraction (weighted by employment) of collective settlements including
a provision to facilitate retirement of workers aged 64 without incurring age penalty. This
variable only applies to people aged 64 enrolled in RGSS.
² Mandatory retirement at 65: Fraction (weighted by employment) of collective settlements
including a provision promoting mandatory retirement at 65. This variable only applies to
people aged 65 enrolled in RGSS.
The Spanish Labor Force Survey or EPA
EPA: A quarterly CPS-like survey of roughly 60,000 Spanish households. It contains fairly detailed
information on labor force status, education and family background variables but no information on
wages and income. Publicly released cross-sectional ﬁles are available from 1976 onward. Starting
with 1987, INE also releases the so called Encuesta de Poblacion Activa Enlazada or EPAL, which
is the panel version of EPA obtained by exploiting the rotating cross-section nature of the origin
al survey. It contains fewer variables than EPA, but it permits to follow individuals for up to 6
consecutive quarters.A DATA AND VARIABLES 42
Table 3: Probit models of the 1995 retirement rates.
ACCRUAL PEAK OV
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Male RGSS: 16191 obs.
SSW .00749 .00152 .01387 .00170 .01627 .00186
(m.e.) .00071 .00014 .00136 .00017 .00161 .00018
Incent. -.00130 .00489 .00448 .00254 .01032 .00115
(m.e.) -.00012 .00046 .00044 .00025 .00102 .00011
Cons. -1.197 .53053 -1.273 .52863 -1.262 .53657
R2 log-l R2 log-l R2 log-l
.373 -3579. .380 -3544. .381 -3534.
Female RGSS: 3852 obs.
SSW .01812 .00419 .02022 .00438 .02175 .00477
(m.e.) .00162 .00038 .00185 .00040 .00199 .00044
Incent. -.00580 .00755 .00393 .00527 .00361 .00210
(m.e.) -.00053 .00068 .00036 .00048 .00033 .00019
Cons. -.2204 .74217 -.2072 .74880 -.3375 .75922
R2 log-l R2 log-l R2 log-l
.355 -860.1 .356 -858.5 .356 -858.5
Male RETA 4355 obs.
SSW .00726 .01174 .00992 .01238 .00501 .01451
(m.e.) .00096 .00155 .00131 .00163 .00066 .00191
Incent. .01050 .01440 .01432 .01056 .00187 .00758
(m.e.) .00138 .00190 .00188 .00139 .00025 .00100
Cons. -1.542 1.2772 -1.6444 1.2819 -1.324 1.283
R2 log-l R2 log-l R2 log-l
.252 -1079. .253 -1078. .253 -1079.
Female RETA 2051 obs.
SSW -.00176 .01113 -.00248 .01119 -.01475 .01781
(m.e.) -.00025 .00156 -.00035 .00157 -.00207 .00250
Incent. .02538 .01207 .01824 .01039 .00739 .01736
(m.e.) .00355 .00169 .00256 .00146 .00104 .00244
Cons. -3.678 3.7786 -2.4574 3.8070 -1.876 3.9571
R2 log-l R2 log-l R2 log-l
.197 -597.9 .196 -598.5 .195 -598.9
note: m.e. stands for marginal eﬀectA DATA AND VARIABLES 43
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Table 5: Fiscal impact of reforms: Males in RGSS. In 106 2001 Euros.
PDV Change rel. to base
Base +3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act.Adj. Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) B/A C/A D/A E/A
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 12000 10061 9730 12280 8032 -16.2 -18.9 2.3 -33.1
Taxes: Payroll 5558 5730 6491 5698 5989 3.1 16.8 2.5 7.8
Taxes: Income 2341 1902 1968 2426 1529 -18.8 -15.9 3.7 -34.7
Taxes: VAT 1791 1553 1478 1820 1293 -13.3 -17.4 1.6 -27.8
Taxes: Total 9689 9185 9937 9944 8811 -5.2 2.6 2.6 -9.1
Option Value
Beneﬁts 11829 10119 9676 12572 8009 -14.5 -18.2 6.3 -32.3
Taxes: Payroll 5654 5658 6494 5303 5516 0.1 14.9 -6.2 -2.4
Taxes: Income 2316 1904 1955 2441 1466 -17.8 -15.6 5.4 -36.7
Taxes: VAT 1766 1563 1472 1867 1305 -11.5 -16.6 5.8 -26.1
Taxes: Total 9735 9125 9920 9611 8287 -6.3 1.9 -1.3 -14.9
Base R-97 R-97 + A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 12000 11922 12392 -0.6 3.3
Taxes: Payroll 5558 5512 5601 -0.8 0.8
Taxes: Income 2341 2302 2454 -1.7 4.8
Taxes: VAT 1791 1783 1832 -0.4 2.3
Taxes: Total 9689 9597 9886 -1.0 2.0
Option Value
Beneﬁts 11829 11829 12427 0.0 5.0
Taxes: Payroll 5654 5629 5584 -0.4 -1.2
Taxes: Income 2316 2297 2460 -0.8 6.2
Taxes: VAT 1766 1768 1837 0.2 4.0
Taxes: Total 9735 9694 9881 -0.4 1.5A DATA AND VARIABLES 45
Table 6: Fiscal impact of reforms: Females in RGSS. In 106 2001 Euros.
PDV Change rel. to base
Base +3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act.Adj. Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) B/A C/A D/A E/A
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 4360 3673 3557 4457 2709 -15.8 -18.4 2.2 -37.9
Taxes: Payroll 2074 2139 2424 2126 2243 3.1 16.9 2.5 8.1
Taxes: Income 819 666 693 848 508 -18.6 -15.4 3.6 -38.0
Taxes: VAT 658 573 546 668 446 -12.9 -17.0 1.5 -32.1
Taxes: Total 3551 3379 3663 3642 3197 -4.8 3.2 2.6 -10.0
Option Value
Beneﬁts 4329 3736 3587 4570 2705 -13.7 -17.1 5.6 -37.5
Taxes: Payroll 2001 2027 2298 1883 2084 1.3 14.8 -5.9 4.1
Taxes: Income 813 680 694 852 497 -16.4 -14.6 4.8 -38.8
Taxes: VAT 652 580 550 685 448 -11.0 -15.6 5.1 -31.2
Taxes: Total 3466 3287 3542 3420 3030 -5.2 2.2 -1.3 -12.6
Base R-97 R-97 + A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 4360 4319 4477 -0.9 2.7
Taxes: Payroll 2074 2058 2093 -0.8 0.9
Taxes: Income 819 803 854 -1.9 4.3
Taxes: VAT 658 653 669 -0.7 1.8
Taxes: Total 3551 3514 3616 -1.0 1.9
Option Value
Beneﬁts 4329 4316 4524 -0.3 4.5
Taxes: Payroll 2001 1993 1959 -0.4 -2.1
Taxes: Income 813 804 857 -1.1 5.5
Taxes: VAT 652 651 676 -0.1 3.7
Taxes: Total 3466 3448 3492 -0.5 0.8A DATA AND VARIABLES 46
Table 7: Decomposition of the total eﬀect: Males in RGSS. In 106 2001 Euros.
Change in PDV
+3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act. Adj. Common
Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -1944 5 -1939 -1944 -325 -2270 320 -40 280 -3997 29 -3968
Taxes: Total -695 191 -504 -695 943 248 115 140 255 -1334 455 -878
Net Change -1249 -186 -1435 -1249 -1268 -2518 206 -180 25 -2664 -426 -3090
Rel. Change -10.4 -1.5 -12.0 -10.4 -10.6 -21.0 1.7 -1.5 0.2 -22.2 -3.5 -25.7
Option Value
Beneﬁts -1814 103 -1711 -1814 -339 -2153 280 462 742 -3829 8 -3821
Taxes: Total -649 39 -610 -649 834 185 100 -224 -124 -1276 -173 -1448
Net Change -1165 64 -1100 -1165 -1173 -2338 181 686 867 -2553 181 -2372
Rel. Change -9.8 0.5 -9.3 -9.8 -9.9 -19.8 1.5 5.8 7.3 -21.6 1.5 -20.1
R97 R97+A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -56 -22 -78 430 -37 393
Taxes: Total -31 -62 -92 163 34 197
Net Change -25 40 14 267 -71 196
Rel. Change -0.2 0.3 0.1 2.2 -0.6 1.6
Option Value
Beneﬁts -37 37 0 454 143 597
Taxes: Total -24 -18 -42 173 -27 146
Net Change -13 54 42 282 170 452
Rel. Change -0.1 0.5 0.4 2.4 1.4 3.8A DATA AND VARIABLES 47
Table 8: Decomposition of the total eﬀect: Females in RGSS. In 106 2001 Euros.
Change in PDV
+3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act. Adj. Common
Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -680 -7 -687 -680 -123 -803 112 -15 97 -1663 11 -1651
Taxes: Total -241 69 -172 -241 353 113 40 52 91 -531 177 -354
Net Change -439 -76 -515 -439 -476 -916 72 -67 5 -1132 -166 -1297
Rel. Change -10.1 -1.7 -11.8 -10.1 -10.9 -21.0 1.7 -1.5 0.1 -26.0 -3.8 -29.8
Option Value
Beneﬁts -610 16 -593 -610 -132 -742 93 148 241 -1640 16 -1624
Taxes: Total -214 35 -179 -214 290 76 33 -79 -46 -515 79 -436
Net Change -396 -18 -414 -396 -422 -818 60 227 287 -1126 -63 -1188
Rel. Change -9.1 -0.4 -9.6 -9.1 -9.8 -18.9 1.4 5.2 6.6 -26.0 -1.4 -27.4
R97 R97+A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -33 -7 -41 131 -14 117
Taxes: Total -15 -22 -36 51 15 66
Net Change -19 15 -4 81 -29 51
Rel. Change -0.4 0.3 -0.1 1.9 -0.7 1.2
Option Value
Beneﬁts -20 7 -13 146 49 196
Taxes: Total -10 -8 -18 57 -31 26
Net Change -10 15 6 89 81 170
Rel. Change -0.2 0.3 0.1 2.1 1.9 3.9A DATA AND VARIABLES 48
Table 9: Fiscal impact of reforms: Males in RESS. In 106 2001 Euros.
PDV Change rel. to base
Base +3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act.Adj. Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) B/A C/A D/A E/A
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 2340 1868 1835 2403 987 -20.2 -21.6 2.7 -57.8
Taxes: Payroll 591 629 761 603 687 6.3 28.7 1.9 16.2
Taxes: Income 423 361 363 434 249 -14.5 -14.1 2.8 -41.0
Taxes: VAT 332 267 261 340 146 -19.5 -21.5 2.4 -56.0
Taxes: Total 1346 1257 1385 1377 1082 -6.6 2.9 2.3 -19.6
Option Value
Beneﬁts 2318 1849 1805 2342 984 -20.2 -22.1 1.0 -57.5
Taxes: Payroll 660 766 875 684 856 16.0 32.5 3.5 29.5
Taxes: Income 425 363 364 431 250 -14.8 -14.5 1.4 -41.2
Taxes: VAT 327 263 254 330 144 -19.8 -22.3 0.8 -56.1
Taxes: Total 1413 1391 1493 1445 1250 -1.6 5.7 2.2 -11.6
Base R-97 R-97 + A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 2340 2272 2243 -2.9 -4.1
Taxes: Payroll 591 594 632 0.4 6.8
Taxes: Income 423 411 414 -2.8 -2.0
Taxes: VAT 332 323 318 -2.7 -4.3
Taxes: Total 1346 1328 1364 -1.3 1.3
Option Value
Beneﬁts 2318 2245 2205 -3.1 -4.9
Taxes: Payroll 660 672 699 1.8 5.8
Taxes: Income 425 413 413 -2.9 -3.0
Taxes: VAT 327 318 311 -2.9 -4.9
Taxes: Total 1413 1403 1423 -0.7 0.7A DATA AND VARIABLES 49
Table 10: Fiscal impact of reforms: Females in RESS. In 106 2001 Euros.
PDV Change rel. to base
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) B/A C/A D/A E/A
Base +3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act-Adj Common
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 742 594 582 760 300 -19.9 -21.5 2.4 -59.5
Taxes: Payroll 186 197 239 189 216 5.7 28.1 1.4 15.9
Taxes: Income 134 114 115 137 78 -14.3 -14.1 2.4 -42.0
Taxes: VAT 105 85 83 108 45 -19.2 -21.5 2.2 -57.7
Taxes: Total 425 396 436 433 338 -6.8 2.6 1.9 -20.5
Option Value
Beneﬁts 745 598 586 763 299 -19.7 -21.3 2.4 -59.8
Taxes: Payroll 170 183 222 170 198 7.6 31.2 0.1 16.5
Taxes: Income 133 115 115 136 78 -13.5 -13.7 2.3 -41.3
Taxes: VAT 106 86 83 108 45 -19.1 -21.3 2.2 -58.0
Taxes: Total 409 383 421 414 320 -6.2 3.0 1.3 -21.6
Base R-97 R-97 + A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 742 721 710 -2.8 -4.3
Taxes: Payroll 186 187 198 0.4 6.4
Taxes: Income 134 130 131 -2.7 -2.2
Taxes: VAT 105 103 101 -2.5 -4.5
Taxes: Total 425 419 429 -1.3 1.0
Option Value
Beneﬁts 745 727 712 -2.4 -4.4
Taxes: Payroll 170 173 184 2.0 8.7
Taxes: Income 133 130 130 -2.2 -2.0
Taxes: VAT 106 104 101 -2.2 -4.6
Taxes: Total 409 407 416 -0.5 1.8A DATA AND VARIABLES 50
Table 11: Decomposition of the total eﬀect of Reforms by regime: Male in RESS. In 106 2001
Euros.
change in PDV
+3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act-Adj Common
Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -467 -5 -472 -467 -38 -504 58 6 64 -1366 13 -1353
Taxes: Total -124 36 -89 -124 163 39 17 14 31 -357 93 -264
Net Change -342 -40 -383 -342 -200 -543 40 -8 33 -1009 -80 -1089
Rel. Change -14.6 -1.7 -16.4 -14.6 -8.6 -23.2 1.7 -0.3 1.4 -43.1 -3.4 -46.6
Option Value
Beneﬁts -420 -49 -469 -420 -93 -513 44 -20 24 -1346 12 -1334
Taxes: Total -114 92 -22 -114 194 80 14 18 32 -355 192 -164
Net Change -306 -141 -447 -306 -287 -593 31 -38 -8 -991 -180 -1170
Rel. Change -13.2 -6.1 -19.3 -13.2 -12.4 -25.6 1.3 -1.6 -0.3 -42.7 -7.7 -50.5
R97 R97+A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -67 -1 -68 -88 -8 -96
Taxes: Total -21 3 -18 -22 40 18
Net Change -46 -4 -50 -66 -48 -114
Rel. Change -2.0 -0.2 -2.1 -2.8 -2.1 -4.9
Option Value
Beneﬁts -69 -4 -73 -89 -25 -113
Taxes: Total -22 11 -10 -23 33 10
Net Change -47 -15 -62 -66 -57 -123
Rel. Change -2.0 -0.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.5 -5.3A DATA AND VARIABLES 51
Table 12: Decomposition of the total eﬀect of Reforms: males in RESS. In 106 2001 Euros.
change in PDV
+3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act. Adj. Common
Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -145 -2 -148 -145 -14 -160 16 2 18 -446 4 -442
Taxes: Total -39 10 -29 -39 50 11 5 3 8 -116 29 -87
Net Change -107 -12 -119 -107 -64 -171 11 -2 10 -330 -25 -354
Rel. Change -14.4 -1.6 -16.0 -14.4 -8.6 -23.0 1.5 -0.2 1.3 -44.5 -3.3 -47.8
Option Value
Beneﬁts -143 -3 -147 -143 -15 -158 17 1 18 -451 5 -446
Taxes: Total -37 12 -25 -37 49 12 5 1 6 -116 27 -88
Net Change -106 -15 -121 -106 -64 -171 12 1 12 -335 -22 -357
Rel. Change -14.3 -2.0 -16.3 -14.3 -8.6 -22.9 1.6 0.1 1.7 -45.0 -3.0 -47.9
R97 R97+A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -20 -0 -21 -29 -3 -32
Taxes: Total -6 1 -6 -7 11 4
Net Change -14 -1 -15 -22 -15 -36
Rel. Change -1.9 -0.2 -2.0 -2.9 -2.0 -4.9
Option Value
Beneﬁts -17 -1 -18 -29 -3 -32
Taxes: Total -5 3 -2 -7 14 7
Net Change -12 -4 -16 -22 -18 -40
Rel. Change -1.6 -0.6 -2.1 -3.0 -2.4 -5.3A DATA AND VARIABLES 52
Table 13: Total ﬁscal impact of Reforms. In 106 2001 Euros.
PDV Change rel. to base
Base +3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act.Adj. Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) B/A C/A D/A E/A
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 19441 16195 15704 19900 12027 -16.7 -19.2 2.4 -38.1
Taxes: Payroll 8410 8695 9915 8616 9135 3.4 17.9 2.5 8.6
Taxes: Income 3716 3044 3138 3846 2363 -18.1 -15.5 3.5 -36.4
Taxes: VAT 2885 2478 2368 2935 1929 -14.1 -17.9 1.7 -33.1
Taxes: Total 15011 14217 15421 15397 13428 -5.3 2.7 2.6 -10.5
Option Value
Beneﬁts 19221 16301 15655 20247 11997 -15.2 -18.6 5.3 -37.6
Taxes: Payroll 8485 8633 9889 8040 8653 1.7 16.5 -5.3 2.0
Taxes: Income 3687 3062 3128 3860 2292 -17.0 -15.2 4.7 -37.8
Taxes: VAT 2851 2491 2360 2991 1942 -12.6 -17.2 4.9 -31.9
Taxes: Total 15023 14186 15376 14891 12887 -5.6 2.3 -0.9 -14.2
Base R-97 R-97 + A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts 19441 19234 19822 -1.1 2.0
Taxes: Payroll 8410 8351 8524 -0.7 1.4
Taxes: Income 3716 3646 3853 -1.9 3.7
Taxes: VAT 2885 2862 2920 -0.8 1.2
Taxes: Total 15011 14859 15296 -1.0 1.9
Option Value
Beneﬁts 19221 19118 19869 -0.5 3.4
Taxes: Payroll 8485 8467 8426 -0.2 -0.7
Taxes: Income 3687 3644 3861 -1.2 4.7
Taxes: VAT 2851 2841 2925 -0.3 2.6
Taxes: Total 15023 14951 15212 -0.5 1.3A DATA AND VARIABLES 53
Table 14: Decomposition of the total eﬀect of Reforms. In 106 2001 Euros.
change in PDV
+3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act. Adj. Common
Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total Mech. Beh. Total
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -3236 -9 -3246 -3236 -500 -3737 506 -47 459 -7472 58 -7414
Taxes: Total -1099 305 -794 -1099 1509 410 177 209 386 -2337 754 -1583
Net Change -2138 -314 -2452 -2138 -2009 -4147 329 -256 73 -5135 -696 -5831
Rel. Change -11.0 -1.6 -12.6 -11.0 -10.3 -21.3 1.7 -1.3 0.4 -26.4 -3.6 -30.0
Option Value
Beneﬁts -2987 67 -2920 -2987 -579 -3567 434 591 1025 -7265 41 -7224
Taxes: Total -1014 177 -837 -1014 1367 353 152 -285 -133 -2261 125 -2136
Net Change -1973 -110 -2083 -1973 -1946 -3920 283 876 1158 -5004 -84 -5088
Rel. Change -10.3 -0.6 -10.8 -10.3 -10.1 -20.4 1.5 4.6 6.0 -26.0 -0.4 -26.5
R97 R97+A02
Peak Value
Beneﬁts -177 -31 -207 445 -63 382
Taxes: Total -72 -80 -152 185 100 285
Net Change -104 49 -55 260 -163 97
Rel. Change -0.5 0.3 -0.3 1.3 -0.8 0.5
Option Value
Beneﬁts -142 39 -103 483 165 647
Taxes: Total -61 -11 -72 200 -11 189
Net Change -81 50 -31 283 176 459
Rel. Change -0.4 0.3 -0.2 1.5 0.9 2.4A DATA AND VARIABLES 54
Table 15: Distributional Analysis. Comparative reforms. Option Value. In 106 2001 Euros.
PDV Change rel. to base
Base +3-year S2 +3-year S3 Act.Adj. Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) B-A C-A D-A E-A
1st quintile (highest)
Beneﬁts 5510 4723 4554 5888 4599 -787 -955 378 -911
Taxes: Payroll 2906 2946 3310 2716 2591 40 404 -190 -315
Taxes: Income 1320 1134 1146 1390 1063 -185 -174 70 -257
Taxes: VAT 810 716 681 861 713 -94 -129 6.3 -97
Taxes: Total 5035 4796 5136 4966 4367 -239 101 -69 -669
Net Change -548 -1056 447 -242
change as a % of Base ben. -9.9 -19.2 8.1 -4.4
2nd quintile
Beneﬁts 4438 3689 3551 4731 2816 -749 -887 293 -1622
Taxes: Payroll 1995 2039 2346 1873 2115 44 351 -122 120
Taxes: Income 899 728 748 950 535 -171 -151 51 -364
Taxes: VAT 649 559 529 689 452 -91 -120 6.1 -197
Taxes: Total 3544 3326 3623 3513 3102 -218 79 -31 -441
Net Change -531 -966 324 -1180
change as a % of Base ben. -12.0 -21.8 7.3 -26.6
3rd quintile
Beneﬁts 3501 2924 2813 3688 1990 -577 -689 187 -1512
Taxes: Payroll 1504 1531 1758 1436 1622 28 254 -68 118
Taxes: Income 619 497 514 649 320 -122 -106 30 -299
Taxes: VAT 519 448 424 545 328 -71 -95 4.9 -191
Taxes: Total 2642 2476 2696 2629 2271 -166 54 -13 -371
Net Change -411 -742 200 -1141
change as a % of Base ben. -11.7 -21.2 5.7 -32.6
4th quintile
Beneﬁts 3151 2656 2543 3272 1597 -495 -608 121 -1554
Taxes: Payroll 1216 1238 1436 1175 1310 22 220 -41 94
Taxes: Income 490 395 408 507 226 -95 -82 17 -264
Taxes: VAT 473 411 388 490 271 -63 -85 3.6 -203
Taxes: Total 2179 2043 2231 2172 1807 -137 52 -7 -372
Net Change -358 -661 128 -1182
change as a % of Base ben. -11.4 -21.0 4.1 -37.5
5th quintile (lowest)
Beneﬁts 2602 2291 2167 2647 984 -311 -435 46 -1618
Taxes: Payroll 862 876 1034 838 1011 14 172 -24 148
Taxes: Income 356 305 309 361 145 -51 -47 5 -211
Taxes: VAT 397 356 333 403 175 -41 -63 1.7 -221
Taxes: Total 1615 1537 1676 1602 1331 -78 62 -13 -283
Net Change -233 -497 58 -1334
change as a % of Base ben. -9.0 -19.1 2.2 -51.3A DATA AND VARIABLES 55
Table 16: Distributional Analysis. Spanish reforms. In 106 2001 Euros.
PDV Change rel. to base
Base R97 R97+A02
(A) (B) (C) B-A C-A
1st quintile (highest)
Beneﬁts 5510 5526 5864 16 354
Taxes: Payroll 2906 2882 2854 -24 -51
Taxes: Income 1320 1313 1416 -6 96
Taxes: VAT 810 813 850 3 40
Taxes: Total 5035 5009 1.7 -27 85
Net Change 43 269
change as a % of Base ben. 0.8 4.9
2nd quintile
Beneﬁts 4438 4425 4637 -13 199
Taxes: Payroll 1995 1991 1977 -4 -18
Taxes: Income 899 888 947 -11 47
Taxes: VAT 649 649 673 -0 24
Taxes: Total 3544 3528 1.5 -15 53
Net Change 3 146
change as a % of Base ben. 0.1 3.3
3rd quintile
Beneﬁts 3501 3487 3618 -14 117
Taxes: Payroll 1504 1504 1498 -0 -5
Taxes: Income 619 613 647 -6 28
Taxes: VAT 519 518 533 -1 14
Taxes: Total 2642 2634 1.4 -8 36
Net Change -7 81
change as a % of Base ben. -0.2 2.3
4th quintile
Beneﬁts 3151 3111 3183 -40 32
Taxes: Payroll 1216 1220 1219 4 3
Taxes: Income 490 481 499 -9 9
Taxes: VAT 473 468 477 -5 4
Taxes: Total 2179 2169 0.7 -11 16
Net Change -30 16
change as a % of Base ben. -0.9 0.5
5th quintile
Beneﬁts 2602 2551 2546 -51 -56
Taxes: Payroll 862 867 874 5 12
Taxes: Income 356 345 349 -11 -7
Taxes: VAT 397 390 389 -6 -8
Taxes: Total 1615 1603 -0.2 -12 -3
Net Change -39 -53
change as a % of Base ben. -1.5 -2.0